G.R. No. L-33007, June 18, 1976
VICENTE MIRANDA, Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Hilarion Dydongco, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO TANTUICO, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, DY CHUN, DY SUAT HONG, DY LEE, DY SEKO, TAN HO NOLASCO DYCOTHAY (deceased), substituted by JOSE KOO ENG LIN DY, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of NOLASCO DYCOTHAY, “AGUSAN COMMERCIAL”, “EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO” “HIAP BEE”, and “EAST MINDANAO LUMBER CO., INC.”, respondents.

FACTS

This case involves a protracted dispute over the intestate estate of Hilarion Dydongco. The procedural history is complex. Judge Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a decision on July 26, 1965, which was challenged. In a prior case, Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, the Supreme Court characterized Judge Mendoza’s decision as interlocutory. Subsequently, Judge Francisco Tantuico, Jr., the successor judge in the same court, reviewed the records and promulgated an amended decision that effectively reversed the findings of Judge Mendoza. Petitioner Vicente Miranda, the estate administrator, assailed this action via a special civil action for certiorari, arguing that Judge Tantuico gravely abused his discretion by reviewing and reversing a decision of a co-equal and predecessor judge. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, prompting this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether a presiding judge of a Court of First Instance commits grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, by amending or reversing an interlocutory decision rendered by a predecessor judge in the same court.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through the main opinion, denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The legal logic hinges on the nature of an interlocutory order and the inherent powers of a court. The Court reaffirmed that the decision of Judge Mendoza, having been declared interlocutory in Dy Chun vs. Mendoza, was not final and executory. An interlocutory order does not finally dispose of the proceeding; it remains within the control of the court and is subject to modification or reversal at any time before final judgment. Consequently, Judge Tantuico, as the presiding judge of the same court, possessed the inherent authority to amend, modify, or correct such an interlocutory decision based on his review of the evidence of record. His action was an exercise of judicial discretion within his jurisdiction, not a usurpation of appellate authority. Any error in his amended decision would be an error of judgment, correctible by ordinary appeal, not a jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari. The policy consideration is to avoid multiplicity of appeals and to allow the trial court to correct its own processes before finality. The separate concurring opinion of Justice Barredo emphasized this point, noting that the holding in Dy Chun established the “law of the case” regarding the interlocutory nature of the Mendoza decision, thus fully authorizing Judge Tantuico’s subsequent review and amendment.