G.R. No. L-32709 May 26, 1977
DI’ MARK’S INC., petitioner, vs. HON. G. A. BUENDIA, Judge of the City Court of Baguio, Branch I, and LANEY MULLER TRUST, represented by OLGA M. BRADY, Trustee, respondents.

FACTS

On October 27, 1970, DI’ MARK’S Inc. filed a petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court. The petition sought to restrain the City Court of Baguio from proceeding with Civil Case No. 4372, an ejectment suit initiated by Olga M. Brady, as trustee of the Laney Muller Trust, against the petitioner. The subject of the ejectment suit was the property located at 4 Abanao Street, Baguio. The petitioner filed a supplemental petition shortly thereafter, and the parties subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, leading the Supreme Court to deem the case submitted for decision on April 13, 1971.
Six years later, in April 1977, the Supreme Court issued a directive requiring both parties to manifest whether the case had become moot and academic. In response, DI’ MARK’S Inc. and the Laney Muller Trust filed separate manifestations. Both parties confirmed that DI’ MARK’S Inc. had already vacated the contested premises at 4 Abanao Street, Baguio, in December 1971. Consequently, they jointly asserted that the legal controversy before the Court had been rendered moot.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the petition for prohibition filed by DI’ MARK’S Inc. should be dismissed on the ground of mootness.

RULING

Yes, the case is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Court’s ruling is grounded on the well-settled legal principle that courts will not adjudicate cases where no actual, substantial, and justiciable controversy exists between the parties. A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a live issue, or when the parties no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the outcome because the events have superseded the dispute.
Here, the core relief sought in the original petition for prohibition was to stop the City Court of Baguio from hearing the ejectment case. However, the subsequent voluntary vacation of the premises by the petitioner in December 1971 fundamentally altered the situation. The ejectment suit’s ultimate objective—to recover possession of the property—was effectively achieved. Any judicial determination on the propriety of the lower court proceeding with the case would therefore be an exercise in futility, as it would have no practical legal effect on the rights of the parties regarding possession. The Court, in line with its policy of avoiding advisory opinions on abstract propositions, dismissed the case without costs, as no live controversy remained to be resolved.