GR 32432 Fernando (Digest)
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner, vs. JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents. G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132 , OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMELEC, respondent.
FACTS
Two consolidated petitions challenged the validity of Republic Act No. 6132 , the Constitutional Convention Act of 1970. The specific provision under challenge in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Fernando is Section 8(a), which prohibits: (1) any candidate for delegate from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or organization; and (2) any political party, political group, civic, religious, professional, or other organization from intervening in the nomination, filing of certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support to any candidate’s campaign. The petitioners, Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, argued this provision was unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Whether Section 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132 , which bans political parties and other organizations from fielding, supporting, or aiding candidates for the Constitutional Convention, violates the constitutional right to form associations and the freedoms of speech and assembly.
RULING
Justice Fernando, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, concurs with the majority opinion of the Court penned by Justice Makasiar on most points but dissents specifically regarding the validity of the ban on political party and organizational support for candidates. He finds the challenged provision unconstitutional on two primary grounds:
1. It directly contravenes the explicit constitutional right “to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law” (Article III, Section 1(6) of the 1935 Constitution). The freedom of association includes the right to collectively pursue common objectives, including political advocacy and supporting candidates. The provision prohibits what the Constitution expressly allows.
2. The saving clause in the same Act, which permits organizations to disseminate information and advocate constitutional reforms but forbids them from supporting the very candidates who could implement those reforms, is inconsistent and further highlights the infringement on associational and expressive freedoms.
He rejects the application of the “clear and present danger” test to justify the ban, finding no such imminent, substantive evil (like the debasement of the electoral process) that would warrant such a severe restriction. He argues the political process and the electorate’s judgment, evidenced by past election outcomes and the requirement of popular ratification for any constitutional changes, are sufficient safeguards. The provision represents an overbroad and unconstitutional means to achieve a potentially desirable end. Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices Villamor and Zaldivar concurred with this dissenting view on the specific provision.
