GR 31814; (January, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-31814 January 31, 1973
RAYMUNDO Z. FAMILARA, petitioner, vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., CITY ENGINEER PANTALEON TABORA OF QUEZON CITY, ALL THE JUDGES PRESIDING OVER THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE AND CITY COURTS OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Raymundo Z. Familara, the barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, filed this original action in his own behalf and in representation of approximately 1,500 alleged bona fide occupants of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. He sought to enjoin respondent corporations J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta, Inc. from bulldozing, fencing, or selling lots within the estate and from filing ejectment cases against the occupants. He also sought to enjoin the City Engineer from issuing building permits to purchasers and the Sheriff from implementing writs of execution or demolition orders. Furthermore, he petitioned for an order compelling judges to dismiss pending ejectment cases filed by the corporations.
The action was predicated on Republic Act No. 2616 , which directed the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate for distribution to its occupants. Petitioner relied specifically on Section 4 of the Act, which suspends ejectment proceedings once expropriation is initiated. However, the petition contained no averment that any actual expropriation proceedings had been instituted in court by the government.
ISSUE
Whether the mere legislative declaration of intent to expropriate property under Republic Act No. 2616 , without the actual institution of court proceedings, suspends the landowner’s dominical rights and bars the enforcement of ejectment orders against occupants.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The legal logic is clear: a declaration of intent to expropriate, without corresponding judicial proceedings, does not divest the owner of proprietary rights. While RA 2616 was declared constitutional, its Section 4—which restrains the owner’s rights—is justifiable only if the government takes possession of the land and is in a position to make contemporaneous payment of just compensation. To hold otherwise would be confiscatory and unconstitutional.
The Court reiterated established jurisprudence involving the same parties and property. It definitively ruled that until condemnation proceedings are fully instituted in court and the government takes possession, the landowner’s dominical rights, including the right to possess and to enforce final ejectment decrees, remain intact. Since the petitioner failed to show that expropriation proceedings were actually filed or that certified funds were available, no valid ground existed to restrict the respondents’ exercise of ownership rights. The petition, therefore, stated no cause of action.