G.R. No. L-31493. May 31, 1973.
JOSE CABAUATAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ISABELA, CHUA SUYA ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Cabauatan filed a complaint in 1968 against the respondents, the surviving siblings of his putative father Chua Chian, who died in 1945. The action sought compulsory recognition as a natural child and partition of real property. The complaint alleged that Cabauatan was born in March 1945, was 23 years old when he filed suit, and was the child of parents with no legal impediment to marry. It further claimed he had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the direct acts of his father and his father’s family, but that the respondents refused to acknowledge him.
The respondents moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action because, under the old Civil Code, illegitimate children other than natural children had no right to inherit. The respondent court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on June 27, 1969. It ruled that since the complaint contained no allegation of voluntary acknowledgment in a record of birth, will, or other public document as required by Article 131 of the old Civil Code, the action to compel recognition could only be brought during the lifetime of the putative father.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

RULING

Yes, the respondent court erred. Its dismissal was based on a misapplication of the law concerning voluntary versus compulsory acknowledgment. Article 131 of the old Civil Code, which requires acknowledgment in specific public documents, governs voluntary recognition. The petitioner’s action, however, was for compulsory recognition under Article 135, which obliges a father to acknowledge a natural child when the child is in continuous possession of that status, justified by the direct acts of the father or his family. The allegations in the complaint precisely invoked this ground.
Furthermore, while Article 137 generally requires that actions for acknowledgment be filed during the lifetime of the supposed parents, it provides an exception: “if the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may commence the action within the four years next following its majority.” The petitioner’s father died in 1945, during the petitioner’s infancy. The complaint, filed in 1968 when the petitioner was 23, was instituted within four years of his reaching majority, thus falling squarely within this exception. The action is properly brought against the heirs of the deceased father.
Procedurally, Article 225 of the new Civil Code applies, stating that pre-existing rights shall be governed by old legislation, but their exercise and the procedure shall be regulated by the new Code and the Rules of Court. The substantive right under Article 137 of the old Code is carried in Article 285 of the new Code. The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.