G.R. No. L-31403 December 14, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JACOBITO MARQUEZ, alias “BOY MARQUEZ”, SATURNINO JARON, CELESTINO ABRIGO, alias “CELING WARAY”, alias “CELESTINO JAVINEZ”, defendants, JACOBITO MARQUEZ, alias “BOY MARQUEZ”, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On the evening of December 23, 1965, inside a passenger jeepney in Davao City, Rolando Jardiel was fatally stabbed. The initial information filed a year later accused only Jacobito Marquez of murder. An amended information later charged Marquez, Saturnino Jaron, and Celestino Abrigo with murder committed in conspiracy. Jaron later pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Marquez and Abrigo pleaded not guilty, but Abrigo escaped custody. After trial, the lower court convicted Marquez, finding conspiracy existed among the accused, rendering each liable for the act of the other, and thus there was no need to ascertain who delivered the fatal blow.
The prosecution evidence established that Marquez, Abrigo, Jaron, and another companion boarded the jeepney. As it reached a specific crossing, someone from the rear ordered the driver to stop, and Marquez suddenly stabbed Jardiel from behind. An eyewitness, Bernardino Mempin, saw Marquez holding the knife and struggled with him. The victim was brought to the hospital where he died. The defense, however, presented a different version, claiming it was Jaron who stabbed the victim and that they concealed this out of fear of Jaron’s retaliation.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jacobito Marquez stabbed the victim, Rolando Jardiel, and whether conspiracy existed to hold him liable as a principal.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the trial court’s decision and ACQUITTED Jacobito Marquez. The legal logic centers on the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and Marquez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the trial court’s conclusion of conspiracy to be grounded on a misapprehension of facts. A conspiracy must be proven as clearly and convincingly as the crime itself, requiring evidence of a common design and concerted action. Here, the evidence did not establish that Marquez and his companions had a prior agreement to kill Jardiel. The suddenness of the stabbing, without proof of prior planning or coordinated action, negates conspiracy.
Crucially, the Court found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Bernardino Mempin, insufficient to sustain a conviction. His testimony contained material inconsistencies, particularly regarding his position in the jeep and his ability to clearly see the assailant in the dark, moving vehicle. The defense’s theory that Jaron was the perpetrator, who had already pleaded guilty, introduced reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on Mempin’s uncorroborated testimony, which the Court deemed inadequate to meet the stringent requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence therefore prevailed in favor of the appellant.