G.R. No. L-31342 and G.R. No. L-31740. April 7, 1976.
JUAN T. BORROMEO, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, respondents.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, ALMA AZNAR and JOSE B. AZNAR, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Matias H. Aznar, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. BORROMEO, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Simeon Rallos, respondents.

FACTS

These are consolidated petitions reviewing a per curiam resolution of the Court of Appeals. The core dispute involves transactions between the heirs of Simeon Rallos (represented by Borromeo) and the Aznars concerning real properties. The trial court and the Court of Appeals’ initial decision held the transactions were absolute sales. However, upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reversed itself via a per curiam resolution, declaring the transactions to be equitable mortgages. It granted the Rallos heirs a one-year redemption period and ordered the Aznars to pay attorney’s fees.
In G.R. No. L-31342, Borromeo appeals, seeking modification of the resolution to include awards for moral and exemplary damages and to increase attorney’s fees. In G.R. No. L-31740, the Aznars appeal, asking for the per curiam resolution to be set aside and the original decision (upholding the absolute sales) reinstated. Preliminary to the merits, Borromeo raised three jurisdictional and procedural challenges against the Aznars’ petition.

ISSUE

The preliminary issues are: (1) Whether the Supreme Court lost jurisdiction to entertain the Aznars’ separate petition (G.R. No. L-31740) because Borromeo filed his petition first; (2) Whether the Aznars’ appeal should be dismissed for filing an incomplete brief; and (3) Whether the Aznars’ appeal raises only questions of fact beyond Supreme Court review.

RULING

The Supreme Court rejected all three preliminary challenges. On the first issue, the Court held that Borromeo’s theory was without merit. The filing of one party’s appeal does not divest the other party of the right to file a separate appeal from the same judgment. To rule otherwise would absurdly allow one party to foreclose the other’s appeal simply by filing first. The Court cited precedents (Simsim v. Belmonte, People v. Ursua) against such a proposition and distinguished the Meralco case invoked by Borromeo.
On the second issue, the Court found the Aznars’ late submission of the digest of arguments and a copy of the appealed resolution—filed 19 days after the brief—was a harmless technicality. The brief itself, containing assignments of error and arguments, was filed on time. The omitted items were not considered integral parts of the brief in a strict sense, and no prejudice was caused. Dismissal of an appeal is not imperative for such an unintentional and minor oversight.
On the third issue, the Court clarified that while the determination of whether a transaction is a sale or a mortgage often involves factual assessment, it is not purely factual. It is a conclusion of law drawn from the established facts. Therefore, such a conclusion is reviewable by the Supreme Court, especially when the appellate court reverses its own decision without a clear explanation for overturning its prior factual conclusions. Having disposed of the preliminary matters, the Court proceeded to the merits, ultimately reversing the per curiam resolution and reinst