GR 31339; (January, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-31339. January 31, 1978.
VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, petitioners, vs. FAR EAST MOTOR CORPORATION and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Far East Motor Corporation sued petitioner Villa Rey Transit, Inc. for a sum of money. The sheriff served the summons on June 16, 1968, at petitioner’s substation, by tendering it to Atty. Virgilio A. Reyes, the Assistant General Manager for Operations, who refused to sign the return. The sheriff then left the papers with a night teller. Petitioner failed to file an answer, leading the trial court to declare it in default and, after ex-parte proceedings, render a judgment against it on October 25, 1968.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Service of Summons, Lift the Order of Default, and Set Aside Judgment, arguing invalid service and excusable negligence. The trial court initially denied this motion but later, upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, granted it on December 27, 1968, quashing the service and setting aside the judgment. Respondent contended the judgment had become final on December 9, 1968. The Court of Appeals, via certiorari, reversed the trial court’s December order and directed execution of the original judgment, prompting this appeal.
ISSUE
The primary issue is whether the service of summons upon the Assistant General Manager for Operations at a corporate substation was valid to confer jurisdiction over the corporation.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling the service was valid and the default judgment had become final. Service upon a corporation is governed by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which allows service on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any director. The Court held that an “Assistant General Manager for Operations” qualifies as a “manager” or “agent” under the rule. The rationale is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation that he would realize his responsibilities. Atty. Reyes, holding a high-ranking operational position, was such a representative. His refusal to receive the summons did not invalidate the tender of service.
Consequently, the trial court acquired jurisdiction. Petitioner’s failure to answer justified the default order and the subsequent ex-parte judgment. The Court computed that the judgment became final and executory on December 9, 1968, as the period for appeal lapsed without a valid appeal or a motion that suspended its running. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was pro forma, as it raised no new substantive arguments, and thus did not suspend the appeal period. The trial court therefore lost jurisdiction to set aside its final judgment on December 27, 1968. Execution of the final judgment was properly ordered.
