G.R. No. L-31229. March 25, 1976.
PY ENG CHONG, petitioner, vs. HON. A. MELENCIO HERRERA, in her capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and JULIA SO DE CHIAT & SONS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Py Eng Chong secured a final and executory money judgment against spouses Eduardo Uy Chiat and Cecilia G. Uy Chiat. After an unsatisfied initial writ, a Second Alias Writ of Execution was issued, leading the sheriff to levy upon twelve parcels of land registered in the name of respondent general partnership, Julia So De Chiat & Sons, wherein the judgment debtors allegedly had an interest. The partnership moved to lift the levy, asserting exclusive ownership and claiming the debtors had sold their interest. It later manifested that judgment debtor Eduardo Uy Chiat had died on March 30, 1968, arguing the court lost jurisdiction to execute against him.
The respondent judge granted the motion and recalled the Second Alias Writ of Execution. The order stated the writ could no longer be enforced due to Eduardo Uy Chiat’s death and directed the judgment creditor to file its claim in the settlement proceedings of the decedent’s estate under Rule 86. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this certiorari petition. Petitioner argued the partnership, as a third-party claimant, should have availed of the remedy under Section 17, Rule 39, and that the court could not modify the final judgment.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in recalling the alias writ of execution upon the death of the judgment debtor and in ruling that the judgment creditor must pursue his claim in the estate settlement proceedings.

RULING

The Supreme Court upheld the respondent judge’s orders and denied the petition. The Court clarified that the death of a judgment debtor after the judgment has become final but before its execution does not extinguish the obligation but merely suspends the action for its enforcement. The proper remedy for the judgment creditor is to file the claim in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased debtor’s estate, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. This rule applies regardless of whether such estate proceedings have already been instituted; the creditor may initiate them if necessary.
The Court found no grave abuse of discretion, as the recall of the writ was legally justified by the debtor’s death. The fact that the judgment was against the conjugal partnership did not alter this procedural requirement. Regarding the procedure, the Court held that the partnership’s motion to lift the levy, which included supporting documents asserting its ownership, substantially complied with the requirements for a third-party claim under Section 17, Rule 39. The primary legal basis for the recall, however, remained the death of the judgment debtor, which rendered execution improper. The preliminary injunction was dissolved.