G.R. No. L-30946 October 29, 1971
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and CHOA PECK alias AMADO PECK, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Choa Peck filed a petition for naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Quezon, which granted a favorable decision on November 19, 1966. After a motion for reconsideration was denied, the Republic attempted to appeal, but the respondent Judge denied a motion for extension to file the record on appeal. Subsequently, on December 2, 1968, Choa Peck filed a petition to take his oath. Respondent Judge issued an order on January 10, 1969, directing the issuance of a certificate of naturalization. Notice of this order was received by the Provincial Fiscal on January 11, 1969, and by the Office of the Solicitor General on January 22, 1969.
On February 17, 1969, within thirty days from the Solicitor General’s receipt, the Republic filed a notice of appeal and a record on appeal, citing fundamental grounds including jurisdictional defects, insufficient income, use of an alias, lack of good moral character, and irregularities in the oath-taking hearing. The respondent Judge, however, issued an order on August 9, 1969, disapproving the record on appeal and dismissing the appeal. He ruled it was filed out of time, counting the reglementary period from the Provincial Fiscal’s receipt on January 11, 1969, rather than from the Solicitor General’s receipt on January 22, 1969.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Republic’s appeal by erroneously computing the reglementary period from the Provincial Fiscal’s receipt of the order, instead of from the Solicitor General’s receipt.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus. The legal logic is firmly established in jurisprudence. In naturalization cases, the period for appealing an order allowing an applicant to take the oath of allegiance commences only upon receipt of the order by the Office of the Solicitor General, not by the local Provincial Fiscal. This rule, as enunciated in Republic v. Chiu and reiterated in Qua v. Republic, is based on the principle that the Solicitor General is the principal legal counsel for the government and must be duly notified to properly exercise the state’s right to appeal.
The respondent Judge’s order directly contravened this settled doctrine. By counting the period from the Provincial Fiscal’s receipt, he effectively deprived the Republic of its statutory right to appeal. Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty—here, the approval of the record on appeal and the elevation of the case records for review. Furthermore, the appeal from the oath-taking order subjects the entire naturalization proceedings to scrutiny, allowing the Supreme Court to review all qualifications and procedural compliance, regardless of whether the issues were raised in the lower court. The Court thus commanded the respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and forward the case for review, restraining Choa Peck from taking the oath or exercising Filipino privileges pending appeal.