GR 30930; (January, 1931) (CRITIQUE)
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THE AI-ASSISTED CRITIQUE
The appellant’s central argument hinges on a purported jurisdictional defect, asserting that the appeal by the Director of Lands was filed beyond the statutory period, thereby rendering this court’s prior decision in G.R. Nos. 20462 and 20463 a nullity. This contention is fundamentally flawed, as it ignores the established procedural context of cadastral proceedings. The court explicitly notes the long-standing practice of computing the appeal period from the notice of adjudication issued by the General Land Registration Office, a practice grounded in practical necessity given the complexity and potential for error in large-scale cadastral cases. Even assuming, arguendo, that the appeal was technically untimely, the appellant’s subsequent conduct precludes him from raising this objection now. By fully participating in the appellate process—filing a brief, arguing on the merits, and failing to object to jurisdiction for nearly five years—the appellant effectively waived any procedural irregularity and is estopped from challenging the finality of the judgment.

The doctrine of estoppel is decisively applied here, barring the appellant’s belated attack on jurisdiction. The court emphasizes that the appellant, after receiving notice of the appeal and the fiscal’s motions, actively contested the case on its merits before this court without raising any jurisdictional challenge. More critically, he remained silent for years while the Director of Lands, relying on the final and executory decision, disposed of the lands to homesteaders. This prolonged inaction, coupled with his prior active litigation conduct, led the government and third parties to change their position to their detriment. The principle that parties may be estopped from denying jurisdictional facts after submitting to the court’s authority is directly invoked, aligning with the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit—equity aids the vigilant. The appellant’s slumber on his rights is fatal to his claim for equitable relief.

Ultimately, the court’s refusal to annul its prior decision is a necessary affirmation of finality of judgments and the protection of innocent third-party rights. To grant the appellant’s petition would not only sanction an unreasonable delay but also unjustly disturb the vested property rights of homesteaders who acquired the lands in good faith years after the judgment became final. The trial court correctly dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction to set aside a Supreme Court decision, as such a collateral attack would undermine judicial stability. The ruling serves as a stern reminder that litigants cannot strategically acquiesce to a court’s authority, await an unfavorable outcome, and then seek to invalidate the entire proceeding based on a waived technicality after others have relied on the judgment.