GR 30912; (April, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30912 April 30, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO DE LA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS
The accused, Agapito de la Cruz, was the overseer of Antonio Yu. He was charged as a principal by inducement for the kidnapping for ransom and murder of Yu Chi Chong, Antonio’s brother. The prosecution evidence, primarily from discharged co-accused turned state witnesses, established that de la Cruz masterminded the plan. He met with the group at his house, provided them with food and instructions, identified the victims, led them to an ambush site, and specified a ransom of P50,000. The group successfully kidnapped Yu Chi Chong on March 6, 1968. However, while the victim was detained at a landing area awaiting transport, a co-conspirator not named de la Cruz shot and killed him during a failed escape attempt. The body was dumped into the sea. De la Cruz was not present at the killing.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether Agapito de la Cruz, as a principal by inducement in the kidnapping conspiracy, can be held criminally liable for the subsequent murder of the victim committed by a co-conspirator without his direct participation or presence.
RULING
The Supreme Court modified the conviction. The legal logic centers on the scope of conspiracy and the liability of a principal by inducement. The Court ruled that de la Cruz is liable only for the crime he induced—kidnapping. The evidence proved conspiracy for kidnapping for ransom, but the killing was a separate, unforeseen act. The Court applied the principle that a conspirator is liable only for acts within the scope of the common design. The murder was not part of the original plan to kidnap for ransom; it was a spontaneous reaction by another accused (Angih) to the victim’s escape attempt. Since de la Cruz did not induce the killing, was not present, and could not have prevented it, he cannot be held liable for homicide. The killing was the separate, individual act of Angih. Consequently, de la Cruz was convicted only of the kidnapping. Considering the aggravating circumstances, his sentence was reduced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen years of reclusion temporal as maximum. The death penalty was set aside.