G.R. No. L-30683 May 31, 1977
CELESTINA GUMABAY, assisted by her husband, DIOSDADO MABBORANG, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIANA BARALIN, SANTIAGO BUNAGAN, LORETO BUNAGAN, BASILIO MAMBA, BALBINO CATABAY, ARCADIO MAGGAY, LUPO GUIYAB and FRANCISCO CALIMARAN, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Plaintiff Celestina Gumabay filed a complaint to recover possession of a parcel of cornland, alleging defendants forcibly entered it on August 5, 1959. She was permitted to sue as a pauper litigant. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the action was for forcible entry within one year, thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court. Before the court could rule, Gumabay filed an amended complaint, transforming the action into one to quiet title by alleging the defendants were claiming ownership. The trial court admitted the amended complaint, denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered defendants to answer.
Defendants initially contested the amended complaint’s admission and their alleged non-receipt of the order. The court directed them to answer, but they failed to do so. Consequently, they were declared in default. An ex parte hearing was held where Gumabay presented evidence of ownership through donation from her father and long-term possession. A judgment by default was rendered in her favor. Defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, citing their lawyers’ neglect and attaching a tax declaration for a different property. The trial court denied the petition.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in: (1) admitting the amended complaint and not dismissing the original action; (2) assuming jurisdiction without new summons for the amended complaint; (3) declaring defendants in default; and (4) denying relief from the judgment by default.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. On the first issue, the amendment was proper and in line with the rules’ objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination. The original complaint already contained a prayer for a declaration of ownership. The amendment merely clarified the nature of the defendants’ adverse claim, making the real issue—ownership—determinable in a single proceeding. Dismissing the original complaint to require a new quiet title action would have been circuitous and burdensome, especially for a pauper litigant.
On the second issue, no new summons was required. Jurisdiction over the defendants’ persons was acquired upon service of summons for the original complaint and their voluntary appearance via the motion to dismiss. They were personally served a copy of the amended complaint and twice ordered by the court to answer. Requiring new summons under these circumstances would be a needless technicality. On the third and fourth issues, the default declaration and denial of relief were justified. Defendants’ lawyers had ample time to answer but failed inexcusably. The purported defense in their petition for relief—a tax declaration for a different land—was not meritorious. Setting aside the default judgment would be an idle ceremony, as there was no probability their evidence would justify a reversal.