G.R. No. L-30420 September 22, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME RAMOS Y DELUSONG alias “BOYING ALIMANGO” alias “BOY” alias “BOYING” alias “ALIMANGO”, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The accused, Jaime Ramos, was convicted of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Dumasig on June 15, 1968, in Tondo, Manila. The prosecution’s case rested primarily on the testimony of a lone eyewitness, Bibiana Baclit. She testified that she was conversing with the victim in front of a restaurant when the accused, whom she identified in court, approached from behind and immediately stabbed Dumasig. The defense presented a different narrative through witness Lydia Brinzon, who was also present at the scene according to Baclit. Brinzon testified that she witnessed the stabbing but asserted that the assailant was not the accused, Jaime Ramos. She described a different sequence where the victim and another man grappled before the stabbing, after which the assailant walked past her, allowing her a clear view of his face. The defense also presented an alibi, claiming Ramos was at a pet shop in Pasay City throughout that day and evening.

ISSUE

Whether the guilt of the accused, Jaime Ramos, for the crime of murder was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused. The Court found that the prosecution failed to meet the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The legal logic centered on the unreliability of the sole prosecution eyewitness and the strength of the defense evidence. The Court noted that Bibiana Baclit’s testimony was seriously impeached by material inconsistencies. During the fiscal’s investigation, she gave varying accounts of how the stabbing occurred, including the number of wounds and whether the assailant held the victim. Such contradictions adversely affected her credibility. In contrast, the Court found the testimony of defense witness Lydia Brinzon to be credible, positive, and natural. Her presence at the crime scene was admitted by the prosecution witness. The Court clarified that her testimony—that the assailant she saw was not the accused—was positive in character, not merely negative, as it was based on her direct observation and ability to recognize the perpetrator. Given the impeached credibility of the lone prosecution witness, the positive testimony of the defense witness placing a different assailant at the scene, and the unrebutted alibi, the evidence created reasonable doubt. Consequently, the accused was entitled to an acquittal.