GR 30370; (May, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-30370 May 25, 1973
PEDRO ADUCAYEN, petitioner, vs. HON. DELFIN V. FLORES, as Presiding Judge of Branch XI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, HON. DAVID C. CONCEPCION, as Municipal Judge of Makati, RIZAL, and REGAL SALES CENTER, INC., respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Regal Sales Center, Inc. filed a collection suit against Simeon Figueras, Jr. and petitioner Pedro Aducayen in the Municipal Court of Makati. Both defendants filed their written answer on February 27, 1968. The municipal judge, respondent David C. Concepcion, set the case for pre-trial on August 22, 1968. On that date, only the defendants’ counsel appeared, informing the court that the principal defendant was ill. Petitioner Aducayen was not notified of this pre-trial setting. Nevertheless, the municipal judge proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence from the plaintiff and rendered a decision dated August 22, 1968, declaring Aducayen in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial and ordering him to pay P644.45.
Subsequently, on September 11, 1968, petitioner received an amended decision dated August 30, 1968, which increased his liability to P2,090.00 based on the same ex-parte evidence. The amended decision also falsely stated that Aducayen failed to appear at a scheduled pre-trial conference on that date, August 30th, when no such conference was scheduled. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance (CFI), arguing a denial of due process. The CFI, presided by respondent Judge Delfin V. Flores, dismissed the petition despite acknowledging that petitioner “has been deprived of a hearing in the lower court.”
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the certiorari petition despite a clear denial of procedural due process in the municipal court.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the CFI order. The legal logic is clear and fundamental: a denial of procedural due process constitutes a grave jurisdictional defect, rendering the resulting judgment void. Certiorari is the proper remedy to annul such a void judgment. The municipal court’s act of declaring petitioner in default and proceeding with an ex-parte hearing was a patent violation of due process because a valid written answer had already been filed. Under the applicable rules, a default judgment is only permissible when a defendant fails to file a written answer. Since an answer was filed, petitioner was entitled to be heard on the merits. The municipal judge’s actions created a “lawless” void order. The CFI’s dismissal of the certiorari petition, despite its own factual finding of a denied hearing, was a marked deviation from settled jurisprudence and constituted a refusal to perform a positive duty. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, annulled the municipal court’s default order and decisions, and ordered a new trial where petitioner’s right to be heard would be respected.
