G.R. No. L-30250 September 22, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PABLO PILPA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The City Fiscal of Tacloban filed an information for Frustrated Murder against Pablo Pilpa. After pleading not guilty, the case proceeded to trial. During a hearing, the prosecution moved to dismiss the case, erroneously contending the information lacked an allegation of “intent to kill” and thus the court lacked jurisdiction. When asked by the court, Pilpa’s counsel explicitly stated, “We have no objection” to the dismissal. The court immediately granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Later that same day, Pilpa’s counsel had a change of mind. He filed a manifestation attempting to place on record Pilpa’s opposition to the dismissal, followed by a formal motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. Meanwhile, the fiscal filed a new information for the same offense, this time explicitly including the phrase “intent to kill.” Pilpa moved to quash this second information on the ground of double jeopardy. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the dismissal of the first case was without Pilpa’s consent due to his subsequent manifestation of opposition.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the second information for frustrated murder places the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING

No, double jeopardy does not attach. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy requires that a prior case was dismissed without the express consent of the accused. Here, the first case was terminated with Pilpa’s express consent. During the hearing, his counsel clearly and unequivocally stated he had no objection to the prosecution’s motion to dismiss. This oral manifestation in open court, made with the accused present and represented, constituted express consent to the dismissal within the meaning of the Rules of Court.
The legal logic is clear: a defendant cannot initially consent to a dismissal and then later revoke that consent to claim the protection of double jeopardy after the court has already acted upon it. The court’s dismissal order, based on the mutual agreement of both parties, became immediately effective. The subsequent filings by the defense—the manifestation of opposition and motion for reconsideration—were mere afterthoughts that could not retroactively nullify the consent already given. The accused is bound by the acts and declarations of his counsel in court. Since the first case was dismissed with his consent, the jeopardy that attached upon his plea was thereby waived. Consequently, the revival of the prosecution via a new information for the same offense is permissible. The order quashing the second information was reversed.