GR 29949; (July, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-29949 July 6, 1978
MISAMIS LUMBER COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, ALI DIMAPORO, NAGA DIMAPORO, KAROMATAN TIMBER AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., CABASADA & SONS CO., INC. and JUAN EXPEDITO ALIX, respondents.
FACTS
Misamis Lumber Co., Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on December 17, 1968, seeking to annul the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated November 15, 1968, which cancelled its timber license in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. The case proceeded with the filing of answers and memoranda by the parties and was submitted for decision on August 21, 1969.
Subsequently, on November 5, 1970, the petitioner submitted for the Court’s approval a Judicial Compromise Agreement dated October 30, 1970. The agreement stipulated that Misamis Lumber would transfer all rights under its timber license to Lanao Agro Industrial Corporation for P300,000.00, payable in three installments. The official respondents, the Secretary and the Director of Forestry, approved the transfer. The compromise included terms for execution and rescission in case of default in payment. This Court approved the compromise in a minute resolution dated November 12, 1970.
ISSUE
Whether the case should be considered terminated following the Court’s approval of the judicial compromise agreement, notwithstanding the lack of confirmation regarding the parties’ compliance with its terms.
RULING
The Court resolved to archive the case. The legal logic is anchored on the final and executory nature of a judgment based on a court-approved compromise. Under the Rules of Court, a compromise, once approved by the court, has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. It constitutes a final judgment that terminates the litigation. The duty of the court ends with the approval of the compromise; enforcement of its terms is a separate ministerial matter typically pursued through a writ of execution in the court of origin if necessary.
In this instance, the Supreme Court’s approval of the compromise on November 12, 1970, effectively ended the appellate proceedings. The subsequent inquiries in 1978, which revealed that the petitioner’s counsel could not confirm compliance due to inability to contact the company president, and the lack of manifestation from other parties, did not revive the case or negate the finality of the compromise judgment. The proper recourse for any party alleging non-compliance is not to keep the original case active indefinitely but to seek execution of the judgment in accordance with the compromise’s own terms, which provided for such a writ. Therefore, archiving the case was a proper administrative action, as the judicial function regarding the merits of the controversy had already been conclusively exercised through the approval of the compromise agreement.