G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

FACTS

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 6537, which made it unlawful for any alien to be employed or engaged in any trade, business, or occupation within the city without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor upon payment of a P50.00 fee. The ordinance provided for penalties of imprisonment, a fine, or both for violations. Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, an alien employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila to declare the ordinance null and void. He argued it violated the rule of uniformity in taxation, constituted an invalid delegation of legislative power, and infringed on the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The respondent Judge Francisco Arca granted the petition, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. Mayor Antonio J. Villegas then filed this petition for certiorari, contending the lower court committed serious errors of law. He argued the ordinance was a valid police power measure, not a pure revenue measure, and thus not subject to the strict rule of uniformity in taxation.

ISSUE

Whether Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of local government power.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and declared Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. The Court rejected the petitioner’s characterization of the ordinance as a mere regulatory measure under police power. While the requirement to secure a permit from the Mayor involved regulatory discretion, the imposition of a fixed P50.00 fee was a revenue measure. There was no logical justification for exacting this fee from aliens already cleared for employment, revealing the ordinance’s primary purpose was to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The ordinance violated the equal protection clause. The P50.00 fee was unreasonable and excessive because it was uniformly imposed on all employed aliens without consideration for substantial differences in their situations, such as whether employment was casual or permanent, part-time or full-time, or whether the alien was a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. A valid classification must be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the legislation’s purpose, which was absent here.
Furthermore, the ordinance constituted an undue delegation of legislative power. It conferred upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny permits, as it laid down no criterion, standard, or policy to guide his discretion. The grant of such unbridled authority without defined limits is unconstitutional. Consequently, the ordinance was invalid for infringing on constitutional guarantees and for improper delegation of power.