G.R. No. L-29575. April 30, 1971.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ADRIANO CARPIO, MARTIN AGUILAR and PEDRO AGUILAR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIANO RAYMUNDO, respondents.

FACTS

Mariano Raymundo applied for registration of title over five parcels of land in Mabitac, Laguna, claiming acquisition through open, adverse, and continuous possession by himself and his predecessors. The Director of Lands opposed the application, asserting lack of registerable title. Oppositors Adriano Carpio, Martin Aguilar, and Pedro Aguilar specifically contested the northern portion of Lot No. 463, claiming actual possession since 1935 and having filed homestead applications.
The trial court adjudicated the southern portion of Lot No. 463 to Raymundo and the northern portion to the oppositors. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified this judgment, awarding the entire Lot No. 463 to Raymundo. This award over the northern portion was based primarily on a purported deed of absolute sale (Exhibit “O”) dated September 18, 1929, from Mariano Castro to Raymundo covering about 80 hectares. The document presented was merely an unsigned copy. The appellate court admitted this secondary evidence, accepting Raymundo’s explanation that the original deed, entrusted to his lawyer before the war, was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation, a story corroborated by the lawyer, Judge Mariano Melendres.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in admitting the unsigned copy of the deed of sale (Exhibit “O”) as secondary evidence to prove Raymundo’s acquisition of the northern portion of Lot No. 463.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error. The Supreme Court reversed its decision regarding the northern portion of Lot No. 463. The legal logic is anchored on the strict rules for proving a transaction involving real property and the prerequisites for introducing secondary evidence of a lost document.
Under the Rules of Court, a sale of real property can only be proved by the original instrument duly subscribed or by secondary evidence of its contents. However, before secondary evidence can be introduced, the proponent must first prove both the due execution of the original document and its subsequent loss. Due execution refers to the fact that the document was genuinely signed or executed by the party bound by it. This must be proved by the testimony of: (1) the person who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or (3) a person who was present and saw it executed and delivered, or who later saw it and recognized the signatures.
In this case, the evidence failed to prove the due execution of the original deed of sale. Judge Melendres’ testimony only established that Raymundo entrusted certain papers to him; he did not testify that he was present during the signing by Mariano Castro, that Castro acknowledged the execution to him, or that he recognized Castro’s signature on the document. The receipt for a down payment (Exhibit O-1) merely proved a payment, not the execution of a formal deed of conveyance. Therefore, the foundational requirement for admitting the unsigned copy as secondary evidence was not satisfied.
Consequently, Raymundo failed to establish his title over the contested northern portion. With no proof that the land had been acquired by any private person from the state, it remains part of the public domain, subject to the possessory rights of the oppositors who had filed homestead applications. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s adjudication of the northern portion to oppositors Carpio and the Aguilars.