G.R. No. L-29422 September 30, 1970
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE MATEO CANONOY, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and PEDRO CLAVANO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and University of San Carlos (USC) filed an ejectment case against respondent Pedro Clavano and others in the Municipal Court of Cebu on November 19, 1962. The Municipal Court ordered the complaint to be split, leading to the filing of a separate case against Clavano (Civil Case No. 10354) on June 22, 1964. The Municipal Court decided in favor of petitioners but granted Clavano certain rights. Petitioners appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI, presided by respondent Judge Mateo Canonoy, rendered a decision on April 24, 1968, ordering Clavano to vacate the premises. Clavano filed a motion for reconsideration, raising the issue of jurisdiction, arguing that the ejectment case was filed more than one year from the first demand to vacate made on June 10, 1960. Respondent Judge granted the motion in a Resolution dated June 25, 1968, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the one-year period for filing an ejectment case should be counted from July 1960 (30 days after the June 10, 1960 demand). Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on August 6, 1968. Petitioners then filed this certiorari action, contending that the one-year period should be counted from the last demand, which was made on May 14, 1962, and that the filing of the case on November 19, 1962 was within the prescribed period.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance (on appeal) correctly dismissed the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that it was filed more than one year from the first demand to vacate.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari. The one-year period for filing an ejectment case is to be counted from the last demand to vacate. The Court reiterated the doctrine established in Sy Oh v. Garcia and other cases, which holds that a lessor has the right to waive the cause of action arising from the first demand and allow the lessee to remain, thereby legalizing the possession until a subsequent demand is made. Since the last demand to respondent Clavano was made on May 14, 1962, and the original complaint was filed on November 19, 1962, the filing was within the one-year period. Respondent Judge’s reliance on Desbarats v. Segarra was misplaced, as that case involved a specific factual context where there was an absence of tolerance or waiver, which was not present here. The Resolution of June 25, 1968 and the Order of August 6, 1968 were declared void. The decision of April 24, 1968 was reinstated and affirmed.