G.R. No. L-29270. November 23, 1971.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RODRIGO YORAC, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The accused, Rodrigo Yorac, was initially charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod after assaulting Lam Hock. The charge was based on a medical certificate dated April 10, 1968, which stated the victim was confined for a head injury. Yorac pleaded guilty on April 16, 1968, was sentenced to ten days of arresto menor, and immediately began serving his sentence.
Subsequently, on April 18, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the Court of First Instance charging Yorac with frustrated murder for the same act against the same victim. This new charge was based on a second medical certificate, dated April 17, 1968, issued by the same physician, which described more severe injuries, including a lacerated wound and cerebral concussion, with a healing period of 18 to 21 days. Yorac filed a motion to quash this second information on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the subsequent prosecution for frustrated murder, after a prior conviction for slight physical injuries arising from the same act, violates the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order granting the motion to quash, thereby dismissing the frustrated murder case. The Court held that the second prosecution placed Yorac in double jeopardy for the same offense. The constitutional right under Article III, Section 1(20) of the 1935 Constitution prohibits placing a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Applying Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a conviction for an offense bars a subsequent prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense first charged.
The crime of slight physical injuries is necessarily included in the crime of frustrated murder. The controlling precedent is People v. Buling. The prosecution argued that the second, more detailed medical certificate revealed a supervening fact—the discovery of more serious injuries—which could justify a new charge. However, the Court found no true supervening fact. The second certificate merely reflected a more thorough examination of injuries that already existed at the time of the first prosecution; it did not indicate any new or aggravating condition that developed after the first conviction. Since all facts necessary for the frustrated murder charge were extant during the first proceeding, the principle of double jeopardy applies. The State had its opportunity to prosecute based on a proper medical assessment, and its failure to do so initially bars a second attempt. The lower court correctly applied Buling and committed no error.