G.R. No. L-29228. April 30, 1971.
LEOPOLDO T. CALDERON, JR., petitioner, vs. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and CECILIO V. MILO, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Cecilio V. Milo was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience to operate an electric service in Pulilan, Bulacan. On February 15, 1967, he sold this franchise and certificate to petitioner Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr. The parties jointly petitioned the Public Service Commission (PSC) for approval of the sale. After several postponements, respondent Milo submitted an affidavit stating he had no objection to the early approval of the transfer. Associate Commissioner Gregorio C. Panganiban, to whom the case was assigned, delegated the reception of evidence to Engr. Pedro Talavera, the Chief of the PSC’s Industrial Division, who was not a lawyer. Respondent’s counsel agreed to this delegation. Based on the evidence received by Engr. Talavera, Commissioner Panganiban rendered a decision on December 19, 1967, approving the sale.
Thirty days after the decision, respondent Milo filed a petition for reconsideration, initially raising grounds related to alleged incomplete collateral agreements and petitioner’s financial capacity. Subsequently, he filed a supplemental motion assailing the validity of the proceedings because Engr. Talavera, not being a lawyer, was allegedly not authorized to receive evidence. The PSC, by a 4-1 vote with Commissioner Panganiban dissenting, granted the reconsideration on June 24, 1968. It set aside its prior decision, holding that Section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 , as amended, only allowed delegation of hearing powers to division chiefs “if they be lawyers.”

ISSUE

May a party who voluntarily agreed to the delegation of the reception of evidence to a non-lawyer division chief of the PSC later validly assail the commission’s decision on the sole ground of such delegation?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court set aside the PSC’s order and reinstated the decision approving the sale. The Court ruled that respondent Milo was estopped from challenging the authority of Engr. Talavera. He had actively participated in the proceedings without objection, even filing an affidavit of non-opposition and, through counsel, expressly agreeing to the delegation. The principle of estoppel precludes a party from taking inconsistent positions to the detriment of another. Having invoked the PSC’s jurisdiction and benefited from the procedural steps he now impugns, respondent cannot repudiate them after an adverse decision.
The Court further clarified that while Section 32 of CA 146 requires division chiefs to be lawyers to hear contested cases, the provision’s intent is to protect the parties’ right to due process. In this uncontested joint petition where both parties were in agreement, the ministerial reception of evidence by a competent technical official like the Industrial Division Chief did not violate due process. The core requirement was the PSC’s ultimate review and decision, which was fulfilled. The technical objection, raised only after an unfavorable ruling, was a mere afterthought. The Court also noted that petitioner had subsequently been granted a congressional franchise for the same service, rendering the issue moot. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.