G.R. No. 29184 . January 30, 1989.
BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Benedicto Leviste, an attorney, entered into a contingent fee agreement with respondent Rosa del Rosario, whereby he would receive thirty-five percent of any property she might inherit upon the successful probate of the holographic will of Maxima C. Reselva. Leviste performed extensive legal services, including filing the petition for probate and presenting witnesses. However, Del Rosario terminated his services, alleging a conflict of interest. Leviste subsequently filed a claim for attorney’s fees and a notice of attorney’s lien in the probate proceedings. The trial court eventually disallowed the probate of the will for insufficiency of evidence. Del Rosario herself did not appeal this decision.
Despite his client’s refusal to appeal, Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The respondents moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing Leviste was not a party in interest. The trial court dismissed the appeal and denied Leviste’s motion to be substituted as party-petitioner. Leviste then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether an attorney engaged on a contingent fee basis may prosecute an appeal to protect his fees despite his client’s refusal to appeal the trial court’s decision.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the dismissal of Leviste’s appeal. The Court’s legal logic is clear: an attorney with only a contingent fee interest lacks the direct, material interest required to prosecute an appeal independently. Leviste’s right to compensation was contingent upon the successful probate of the will. Since the trial court disallowed the will, the contingency for his fee never materialized. Consequently, he had no vested claim that could transform him into a “creditor” of Del Rosario under Article 1052 of the Civil Code, which allows creditors to accept an inheritance in the name of a repudiating heir. That provision was held inapplicable as Del Rosario, upon the will’s disallowance, was not an heir at all.
The Court emphasized that an attorney’s charging lien is merely a right to seek payment from any judgment recovered for the client; it does not confer upon the attorney any real or personal interest in the subject property itself, nor does it permit substitution for the client in litigation. Citing precedents like Recto vs. Harden and Paras vs. Narciso, the Court ruled that only parties with a direct interest in the estate may intervene in probate proceedings. Leviste’s interest was merely indirect and derivative. Public policy favoring the probate of wills does not compel the allowance of every will, especially where, as here, legal requisites were not satisfied. Therefore, Leviste was not the proper party to appeal, and mandamus did not lie to compel the trial court to give due course to his appeal.