GR 28942; (July, 1970) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-28942 July 31, 1970
PEDRO CAPACIO and FLORENTINA UNABIA CAPACIO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. DR. JOSE RIVERA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiffs-appellants Pedro Capacio and Florentina Unabia Capacio filed a complaint for forcible entry in the City Court of Cagayan de Oro against defendant-appellee Dr. Jose Rivera. They alleged ownership and possession of a residential lot and that on August 15, 1966, defendant unlawfully entered a portion of it. Defendant, in his answer, denied the allegations and asserted ownership and occupation of the land since 1938. The City Court, after hearing evidence on defendant’s affirmative defenses, found that defendant’s land was Lot No. 4349, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3111, while plaintiffs’ land, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “B” to their complaint), was a portion of Lot No. 4359. The City Court dismissed the complaint on April 17, 1967, ruling the lands were different. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, including a prayer for ocular inspection, was denied. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. After a pre-trial, the Court of First Instance, on September 21, 1967, also dismissed the case, noting from the allegations of the complaint and answer that the parcel claimed by plaintiffs appeared different from that claimed by defendant, a difference already noted by the City Judge. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the forcible entry case on appeal without conducting a trial de novo, by relying on the City Court’s finding that the lot subject of the complaint was different from the lot occupied by the defendant.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal. The Court held that while a perfected appeal to the Court of First Instance calls for a trial de novo, the lower court did not err. The fatal discrepancy—that the lot plaintiffs alleged was forcibly entered (Lot No. 4359 per their Annex “B”) was different from the lot occupied by defendant (Lot No. 4349)—was evident from plaintiffs’ own pleadings. This discrepancy could be duly taken note of by the Court of First Instance even at the pre-trial stage. The Court found it inaccurate for plaintiffs to assert the lower court relied merely on the City Court’s proceedings, as the lower court judge heard the parties during pre-trial. The conclusion of the lower court was supported by law and the pleadings, demonstrating the inherent weakness of plaintiffs’ suit. The order of dismissal was upheld.
