G.R. No. L-28340 & L-28374 December 29, 1967
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner, vs. Hon. Pedro C. Navarro, Braulio Sto. Domingo and Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Juan, Rizal, respondents. (L-28340) / Joseph Ejercito Estrada, petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections, Braulio Sto. Domingo and Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Juan, Rizal, respondents. (L-28374)

FACTS

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada and respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo were candidates for Municipal Mayor of San Juan, Rizal in the November 14, 1967 election. In G.R. No. L-28340, petitioner filed for certiorari against an order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro dismissing a petition for correction of the election return from Precinct No. 93. The board of election inspectors in that precinct, by a 2-1 vote, had resolved not to count ballots where petitioner was voted for as “Joseph Ejercito Estrada,” “Joseph,” “J. Estrada,” or “Estrada,” alleging these were not his real name, despite a prior court order authorizing him to use “Joseph Estrada.” Consequently, at least 36 votes for petitioner were not tallied. Two inspectors later petitioned the lower court for correction to add these votes, but the court dismissed the petition upon respondent Sto. Domingo’s motion. In G.R. No. L-28374, petitioner sought review of a COMELEC order involving Precinct No. 94. Petitioner applied to COMELEC to reject the return from that precinct as “clearly manufactured” because it showed 229 voters actually voted but 300 valid ballots were found, with the candidates for mayor receiving an aggregate of 298 votes.

ISSUE

1. In G.R. No. L-28340: Whether the correction of the election return for Precinct No. 93 under Section 154 of the Revised Election Code is justified.
2. In G.R. No. L-28374: Whether the election return from Precinct No. 94 should be rejected as obviously manufactured under the doctrine of Lagumbay vs. Commission on Elections.

RULING

1. In G.R. No. L-28340, the petition is dismissed. The correction of the return is not justified. Under Section 154 and jurisprudence, two requisites must concur for correction: (a) an error in the return itself, and (b) unanimity among the board of election inspectors that such error exists and they are willing to rectify it. Here, the first requisite is absent because the alleged error lies not in the return but in the appreciation of the ballots (the inspectors’ decision not to count certain ballots). The return accurately reflected the tally as counted. The second requisite is also absent because there was no unanimity; the third inspector and the poll clerk submitted an affidavit stating they were not aware of any error and did not consent to the correction. Furthermore, the petition was not definite, relying on a speculative mathematical conclusion (a difference of 36 votes between total tallied and votes counted for mayor) that would require examining the ballots themselves, which is not the purpose of a summary correction proceeding.
2. In G.R. No. L-28374, the petition is dismissed. The return from Precinct No. 94 should not be annulled. While the return showed 229 voters and 300 valid ballots, creating a mathematical improbability, the minutes of voting—an official document under Section 142 of the Revised Election Code—showed 299 voters actually voted and that one of the 300 ballots was marked and separated. This provides a plausible explanation that the entry of “229” in the return was a clerical error and the correct figure is “299.” A conclusion that a return is obviously manufactured must be approached with extreme caution and upon convincing proof. Here, the explanation is acceptable, and the entries are consistent with 299 voters, 298 valid votes for mayor, and one rejected marked ballot. The restraining orders in both cases are lifted.