G.R. No. L-28195. June 10, 1971.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF THE MINORS FRANCIS, ALEX, MARIA TERESA, JOSEPH, GREG and GERMAN, all surnamed MILLENDEZ. SINFOROSA T. MILLENDEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS

Sinforosa T. Vda. de Millendez filed a petition to adopt her six grandchildren, the legitimate children of her only son, Bobby Millendez. The petition alleged that Bobby had abandoned the children for over three years, associated with bad company, and was disinherited by his own father for attempting on the latter’s life. The minors’ natural mother consented to the adoption. The petitioner, motivated by love and a desire to secure the children’s future, argued she was financially capable and that the adoption would prevent Bobby from dissipating any inheritance he might receive from her, thereby protecting the grandchildren’s welfare.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental denied the petition. The court found that while the adoption would benefit the minors, it was expressly prohibited by Article 335 of the New Civil Code, which disqualifies persons who have legitimate children from adopting. The petitioner, having a legitimate son in Bobby Millendez, was thus legally barred. The court suggested alternative means to achieve her goals, such as executing a will or having Bobby declared a spendthrift.

ISSUE

Whether or not the petitioner, who has a legitimate child, is disqualified from adopting her grandchildren under Article 335 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding compelling circumstances that allegedly promote the welfare of the adoptees.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the petitioner is absolutely disqualified from adopting. Article 335(1) of the Civil Code explicitly states that those who have legitimate children cannot adopt. The provision is clear and mandatory, leaving no room for judicial discretion based on the adopter’s motives or the perceived benefits to the child.
The Court rejected the argument for a liberal interpretation. It emphasized that adoption is a statutory privilege that must strictly comply with the law’s terms. The disqualification is personal to the adopter and attaches upon the mere existence of a legitimate child, regardless of that child’s behavior or consent. The son’s alleged prodigality or his consent to the adoption of his own children is legally irrelevant. The Court clarified that the use of the plural “children” in the law is grammatical, and the disqualification applies even if the adopter has only one legitimate child.
The ruling is underpinned by key policy reasons. First, allowing such adoption would introduce a conflicting element into the family unit. Second, and more critically, it would effect an indirect and permanent disinheritance of the legitimate son, Bobby, by reducing his legitime in favor of the adoptees, who are not compulsory heirs of the petitioner. This would circumvent the strict legal requirements for valid disinheritance, such as a testamentary statement of cause and the possibility of subsequent reconciliation, which the law expressly preserves. The son’s consent is void under Article 905, which prohibits renunciation of a future legitime. Therefore, the law’s explicit disqualification must be upheld.