G.R. No. 27846 , August 11, 1927
INES FELICIANO, petitioner, vs. LUIS, MELCHORA and ELISA, by surname FELICIANO Y CAMAHORT, and the Honorable CARLOS A. IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS

Benedicta Feliciano died, leaving a will that instituted her nephew Luis and nieces Melchora and Elisa (children of her deceased brother) as heirs. However, due to concerns about the heirs’ mother, the will stipulated that the inheritance would take effect only upon the heirs’ emancipation or marriage. In the interim, the estate was placed in a trust, with Ines Feliciano (the petitioner) appointed as the first trustee. The will specified that the trust would last until the heirs were “capable of taking care of their persons and property” (clause 13). It also contained a directive (clause 14) that from January 1927 to March 1931, the income from the estate should be deposited and used to purchase a building on a family property. By February 1927, all three heirs had reached majority. They petitioned the court to terminate the trust and order Ines Feliciano to deliver the estate and render a final accounting. The respondent judge, Carlos A. Imperial, granted the petition, issuing an order on February 19, 1927, declaring the trust terminated and ordering the delivery of the property. When Ines Feliciano appealed that order, the judge issued another order on March 14, 1927, requiring her to comply with the delivery and accounting despite the pending appeal. Ines Feliciano then filed this original action for certiorari, arguing that the judge acted in excess of jurisdiction because: (1) two previous judges had denied similar petitions to terminate the trust, and (2) clause 14 of the will, by allocating income until 1931, effectively extended the trust until that year.

ISSUE

1. Did the respondent judge act in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders of February 19 and March 14, 1927, which terminated the trust and ordered the delivery of the estate despite a pending appeal?
2. Did clause 14 of the will, which directed the use of income from 1927 to 1931, extend the duration of the trust beyond the heirs’ attainment of majority?

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition for certiorari and upheld the orders of the respondent judge.

1. On Jurisdiction and Discretion: The Court held that the respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction. Under Section 595 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Judges of First Instance have jurisdiction over matters relating to the termination of trusts created by will. The previous denials of similar petitions by other judges were not final judgments and did not bar the heirs from renewing their petition or the court from granting it. Furthermore, the order for execution pending appeal (the March 14 order) was within the court’s discretionary power. In special proceedings, the execution of interlocutory orders is not specifically regulated by statute, and its grant or suspension is generally discretionary. The Court found no grave abuse of this discretion.

2. On the Duration of the Trust: The Court ruled that clause 14 of the will did not extend the trust’s duration. Clause 13 clearly stated the trust would last only until the heirs were capable of managing their own affairs, which occurred upon their reaching majority. Clause 14 was merely an administrative directive on how to use the income for a specific purpose (buying a building) during a specified period. This directive was intended as an admonition to the heirs themselves to preserve the family property and could be carried out by them after the trust had ended and they had received their inheritance. The period until 1931 related only to the timeframe for accumulating and using the income for the purchase, not to the life of the trust.

CONCLUSION: The respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, nor with grave abuse of discretion. The trust properly terminated when the heirs reached majority, and the directive in clause 14 did not alter that termination. The writ of certiorari, being a remedy for lack of jurisdiction and not for correcting errors of judgment, did not lie. Costs were imposed on the petitioner.