G.R. No. L-27682. April 30, 1976.
TIMOTEO DULTRA and CECILIA DULTRA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN, HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge, Branch 11, Court of First Instance of Agusan; MACARIO C. CONDE, Provincial Sheriff and Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Agusan; ESPERANZA KUIZON GONZALES and SOCORRO KUIZON VIRAY, respondents.

FACTS

The private respondents, Esperanza Kuizon Gonzales and Socorro Kuizon Viray, filed a complaint for recovery of an unregistered riceland against the petitioner spouses, Timoteo and Cecilia Dultra. They alleged the land was invalidly sold by their brother to a predecessor of the Dultras. The summons and complaint were allegedly served on May 12, 1964, by Patrolman Gabriel Bernal, who reported the petitioners refused to accept them. Based on this return, and upon a motion for which no copy was furnished to the petitioners, the trial court declared the Dultras in default and subsequently rendered a judgment against them, ordering them to deliver two-thirds of the land and pay damages.
The petitioners received the decision and timely filed a motion for reconsideration, denying they were ever served with summons and arguing that service by a policeman was invalid under Rule 14. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that a chief of police is an ex-officio deputy sheriff. The petitioners then filed a petition for relief from judgment, which was denied for being filed out of time and for lack of a proper affidavit of merit. Their subsequent attempts to appeal were also dismissed. Execution ensued, and the petitioners filed the instant special civil actions.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default and rendering judgment against them, considering the alleged defects in the service of summons.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the challenged judgment and proceedings, and ordered the trial court to allow the petitioners to file their answer. The Court held that the service of summons was fatally defective. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, service of summons shall be made by the sheriff or his deputy, or for special reasons by any person specifically authorized by the court. A regular policeman is not a sheriff or a duly appointed deputy sheriff. The fact that a municipal chief of police is an ex-officio deputy sheriff does not automatically extend that authority to all members of the police force. Furthermore, under Section 20 of the same Rule, when service is made by a person other than the sheriff or his deputy, proof of service must be under oath. The return in this case, made by Patrolman Bernal, was not sworn to. This defect rendered the service invalid. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners. Its declaration of default and the subsequent judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the defendants were null and void. The Court emphasized that the rules on summons are strictly construed, as they are the means by which a court acquires authority over a defendant.