G.R. No. 27415 , November 29, 1927
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARCOS MERCADO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On July 23, 1926, in Bustos, Bulacan, Marcos Mercado attacked and wounded his brother-in-law, Rufino Lopez, with a sharp weapon on the left side of the abdomen. The wound was serious and extended into the peritoneal cavity, which the attending physician stated could have been fatal without timely treatment. Mercado was convicted of frustrated murder by the trial court and sentenced to *reclusion temporal*.

The prosecution’s evidence, primarily from the victim and witness Alejandro Mercado, presented conflicting accounts of how the attack was initiated. Rufino Lopez claimed he was attacked from behind, while Alejandro Mercado testified that the accused came from behind but suddenly placed himself in front of Rufino before inflicting the wound.

ISSUE

Whether the crime committed is frustrated murder, qualified by treachery (*alevosia*), or the lesser crime of frustrated homicide.

RULING

The Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision. It held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven due to the contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the manner of attack. The Court found it improbable that a wound on the left abdomen could be inflicted from behind by a right-handed assailant, as claimed by the victim. Since the manner of attack could not be established with certainty, treachery could not be appreciated.

However, the Court found that the intent to kill was evident from the seriousness of the wound and Mercado’s subsequent act of picking up another weapon to renew his attack, which was only prevented by intervention. The defense of legitimate self-defense was not proven.

Thus, the crime committed was frustrated homicide, aggravated by the relationship of brother-in-law (affinity). The penalty was imposed one degree lower than that for consummated homicide. The appellant was sentenced to ten years and one day of *reclusion temporal*, with the rest of the trial court’s judgment (indemnity and costs) affirmed.