G.R. No. L-27388 March 23, 1971
TRINIDAD RASAY-LAHOZ, REMEDIOS RASAY-NEPOMUCENO, ILUMINADA RASAY-JOCSON, JOSEFINA RASAY-MAUCK, EDELWINA RASAY and CENON RASAY, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. DOMINGO LEONOR, JULIANA R. DE LEONOR and FRANCISCO LEONOR, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Plaintiffs, heirs of Bienvenido Rasay, filed Civil Case No. 4731 against defendants Domingo, Juliana, and Francisco Leonor. They alleged that as minors, they were defrauded through machinations by Juliana, the judicial administratrix of their father’s estate. They claimed two deeds of sale—one from Juliana to Elena Ledesma and another from Ledesma to Francisco Leonor—were fraudulent and fictitious, executed to unlawfully transfer land titles. They prayed for the deeds’ nullity, reconveyance of the properties, accounting of fruits, and damages. The trial court dismissed this case on October 23, 1965, on the ground of prescription of action.
On November 5, 1965, plaintiffs filed the present action, Civil Case No. 4856, against the same defendants. The new complaint was substantially identical to the first, alleging the same fraudulent machinations and seeking similar relief. The only material differences were minor changes in wording and a prayer that the deeds be declared “fictitious and simulated and void ab initio” instead of merely “null and void.” Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the action was barred by the prior dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the present action is barred by the order of dismissal in the prior case, Civil Case No. 4731.

RULING

Yes, the present action is barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal. The legal logic rests on the application of res judicata, specifically the concept of bar by prior judgment. For res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a final former judgment; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) a judgment on the merits; and (4) identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and second cases.
All these elements are present. First, the order of dismissal in Case No. 4731 was a final judgment. It was not appealed and became final and executory. Second, the court that issued it had jurisdiction. Third, the dismissal based on prescription of action is considered an adjudication on the merits, as it was not explicitly stated to be without prejudice. Fourth, there is clear identity. The parties are identical. The subject matter is the same two deeds of sale and the parcels of land they cover. The cause of action is also identical—the alleged fraudulent deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights as heirs through the execution of the questioned deeds. The Court emphasized that the same evidence would support both complaints, and the relief sought is essentially the same. A party cannot escape the effects of res judicata by merely varying the form of the action or adopting a slightly different method of presenting the case. The plaintiffs’ proper recourse was to amend their complaint in the first case or appeal its dismissal; having done neither, the final order bars the subsequent filing of the same claim.