GR 27042; (September, 1981) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-27042 September 30, 1981
JOVENCIO CONCHA and EULALIA P. CONCHA, spouses, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE C. DIVINAGRACIA, Judge, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch VII, San Carlos City, FERMIN DE LA VICTORIA and CONCEPCION NEMENZO, spouses, respondents.
FACTS
The dispute involves Lot No. 121-A. In a prior Supreme Court decision (G.R. No. L-17966), the Court modified a lower court judgment. It declared that the foreclosure proceedings in a prior case (Civil Case No. 8176) were ineffective against the spouses Fermin de la Victoria and Concepcion Nemenzo (respondents) regarding their 2/8 pro indiviso share of the lot, which they acquired from Anacleto and Marcelino Ortega. The Court specifically protected the respondents’ rights over the portion where they had constructed residential and commercial buildings. The case was remanded for execution.
To enforce this judgment, the respondent trial court issued an order on September 20, 1966, quantifying the respondents’ share as 2,062.82 square meters. It then ordered the petitioners, Jovencio and Eulalia Concha, to deliver this specific area from the portion they were occupying. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision only protected the respondents’ rights over the specific area they actually occupied and improved, not a right to choose any portion of the lot. They also contended that the area they themselves occupied was only about 600 square meters, making compliance impossible.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent trial court, in its execution order, altered or varied the terms of the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is anchored on the principle of execution of judgments. A writ of execution must conform strictly to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed; it cannot amend, expand, or vary the terms of the final judgment. The Supreme Court’s 1965 decision was declaratory. It recognized the respondents’ ownership of an undivided 2/8 (or 1/4) aliquot share of the lot and, critically, their right to possess the specific portion they had actually occupied and improved with their buildings. It did not order a physical segregation or partition of the land, nor did it grant the respondents the right to select a specific 2,062.82-square-meter portion from the petitioners’ occupied area.
The trial court’s order, by commanding the petitioners to deliver a quantified area from their possession, effectively altered the judgment. It went beyond merely declaring rights and attempted to enforce a physical division that was not decreed by the Supreme Court. The proper remedy was not a simple delivery order but a judicial partition of the co-owned property under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court to segregate the respective shares. The trial court thus acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the trial court to conduct the necessary proceedings, potentially including a survey, to effectuate a proper partition in accordance with the declared rights of the parties.
