G.R. No. L-26760. April 30, 1971.
JOAQUINA VENTURA, assisted by her husband, JOSE VENTURA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EUSEBIO BERNABE, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Joaquina Ventura was criminally charged by defendant-appellee Eusebio Bernabe with falsification of a private document. The complaint alleged that Ventura presented a forged letter to Bernabe, leading him to issue a check for P350.00. After trial, the Court of First Instance acquitted Ventura. The acquittal was based on the court’s finding that Bernabe’s testimony was incoherent and vague, and that his motive for filing the charge likely stemmed from a series of misunderstandings with Ventura’s husband. The court found Ventura’s testimony more credible.
Subsequent to her acquittal, Ventura filed a civil action for damages against Bernabe, alleging malicious prosecution. She claimed Bernabe filed the criminal charge with malicious intent and without justifiable cause, seeking moral, exemplary, and actual damages. The trial court dismissed her complaint at the outset, ruling that it stated no cause of action. The court held that since the fiscal conducted a preliminary investigation and filed the corresponding information, a prima facie case existed, negating any inference of malice on the part of the private complainant. Ventura appealed this dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for trial. The Court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for damages arising from malicious prosecution. A cause of action exists if the pleading alleges that the prosecution was prompted by malice, that it ended in acquittal, and that the defendant therein acted without probable cause. Ventura’s complaint explicitly alleged that Bernabe filed the charge with “malicious intent and/or malice aforethought, and without justifiable cause or motive whatsoever, other than to wreck vengeance.” These allegations, taken as hypothetically true in a motion to dismiss, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The trial court erred in ruling that the fiscal’s finding of probable cause and filing of an information automatically negated malice. The fiscal’s participation is not decisive on the question of malice, which must be determined based on all attendant circumstances. A preliminary investigation is designed to prevent baseless prosecutions, but whether this objective was circumvented by a complainant acting with malice is a matter of proof to be established during trial. The Court clarified that while indiscriminate suits for damages after acquittal should not be encouraged, aggrieved parties must have a chance to seek redress in appropriate cases of false and malicious accusation. The complaint’s allegations met the threshold requirement to proceed to trial.