GR 26459; (November, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-26459 November 29, 1973
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE C. NAVARRO, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, JOAQUIN P. ROCES, JOSE LUNA CASTRO, and MARIO MACARANAS.
FACTS
Complainant Felipe C. Navarro initially filed a libel charge with the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City against the accused. The charge was based on a letter by Secretary Rufino Hechanova and a related news item in the Manila Times, which implied Navarro attempted to bribe Hechanova with a P200,000 donation to the Liberal Party to facilitate his appointment as Customs Attaché. After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Fiscal Leonides S. Lombos dismissed the complaint for lack of a prima facie case. Dissatisfied, Navarro refiled an identical libel complaint directly with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, invoking Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court. He did not disclose the prior dismissal by the fiscal.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, had the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation on a libel complaint directly filed by the offended party, given that a prior complaint involving the same parties and subject matter had already been filed with and dismissed by the City Fiscal after investigation.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal order of the CFI. The Court held that Navarro’s direct filing with the CFI was improper and irregular. While Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 , allows libel cases to be filed with the CFI, the conduct of a preliminary investigation in chartered cities is governed by their specific charters. The Revised Charter of Quezon City ( Republic Act No. 537 ) explicitly vests in the City Fiscal the exclusive authority to investigate charges of crimes and conduct preliminary investigations, a duty analogous to that of a provincial fiscal. This statutory scheme was consistently interpreted in prior jurisprudence, such as Sayo v. Chief of Police and Montelibano v. Ferrer, which held that in chartered cities where the city fiscal is empowered by law to conduct preliminary investigations, the offended party cannot bypass this officer by filing directly with the court. Since the libel charge had already been duly investigated and dismissed by the City Fiscal, the CFI correctly refused to entertain the refiled complaint. The Court emphasized that the legislative intent, as evidenced by the city charter and consistent judicial interpretation, mandates that the City Fiscal’s authority over preliminary investigations is exclusive, thereby barring Navarro’s attempted circumvention of the fiscal’s prior dismissal.