G.R. No. 26435 , March 4, 1927
JUANARIA FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LOPE TAYAO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Juanaria Francisco (wife) and Lope Tayao (husband) were married in 1912 and separated in 1917. The husband moved to Zamboanga, where he was later prosecuted and convicted of the crime of adultery with a married woman, Bernardina Medrano. The criminal case was filed by the aggrieved husband of Medrano. Relying on this conviction, Juanaria Francisco filed an action for divorce against Lope Tayao under the Philippine Divorce Law (Act No. 2710). The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed her complaint, ruling that she was not an “innocent spouse” as required by the law. The wife appealed.

ISSUE

May a wife secure a divorce from her husband based on his final conviction for the crime of adultery (as defined under the Penal Code), even if the acts constituting his offense could also amount to concubinage?

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

The Philippine Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) explicitly and restrictively provides that a petition for divorce can only be filed for:
1. Adultery on the part of the wife, or
2. Concubinage on the part of the husband.

The law requires that the guilt of the defendant be established by a final sentence in a criminal action for the specific ground alleged. In this case, the husband was definitively convicted of adultery, not concubinage. While the acts for which he was convicted might also constitute concubinage, the Court emphasized the procedural and substantive distinctions:
* The criminal case was for adultery, initiated by the aggrieved husband of the woman involved.
* A prosecution for concubinage must be instituted by the aggrieved wife.
* The Court cannot, on appeal, convert the husband’s conviction for adultery into a conviction for concubinage. To do so would require the Court to act as a trial court for a crime that was never properly prosecuted.
* Granting the divorce would effectively amend the Divorce Law by adding “adultery on the part of the husband” as a third ground, which is a legislative function, not a judicial one.

Therefore, since the husband was not convicted of concubinage, the specific ground required by law for a wife to obtain a divorce against her husband was not met. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.