G.R. No. L-26407. March 31, 1978.
EUSEBIO MENDOZA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. LA MALLORCA BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On April 3, 1950, a collision in Plaridel, Bulacan, occurred between a freight truck owned by plaintiff Eusebio Mendoza and a bus operated by defendant La Mallorca Bus Company. The bus driver, Claudio Arceo, was convicted for damage to property through reckless imprudence in a criminal case where Mendoza expressly reserved his right to file a separate civil action. Subsequently, on May 8, 1956, Mendoza filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code). This case (Civil Case No. 2137) was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of prescription, as it was filed over six years after the accident. This dismissal order became final.
Thereafter, on August 26, 1957, Mendoza instituted the present civil action, this time predicated on the subsidiary liability of the bus company under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, arising from the driver’s final conviction. The trial court dismissed this second complaint, ruling that the dismissal of the first civil case (No. 2137) operated as a bar under the principle of res judicata. Mendoza appealed this dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of the prior civil action based on quasi-delict (Civil Case No. 2137) bars the subsequent filing of a civil action to enforce the employer’s subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

No, the dismissal does not constitute a bar. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s orders, holding that res judicata is inapplicable because there is no identity of causes of action between the two suits. For res judicata to apply, there must be, among other requisites, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The Court applied the test that identity of causes of action lies not in the form of the action but in whether the same evidence would support and establish both the former and the present causes of action.
The first action (Civil Case No. 2137) was based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code, where the employer’s liability is primary and direct, predicated on its own negligence in the selection or supervision of the employee. The employer could defeat this claim by proving it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. In contrast, the present action is based on the employer’s subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which springs from the employee’s final conviction for a felony committed in the discharge of his duties. Here, the employer’s liability is inseparable from and subsidiary to that of the convicted employee; the defense of due diligence in selection and supervision is unavailing. The evidence required for each action is fundamentally different. Therefore, the two actions are separate and independent, based on distinct causes of action. The Court cited precedent, including Jocson v. Glorioso, establishing that the dismissal of an action based on culpa aquiliana does not preclude the enforcement of subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.