G.R. No. L-26367. January 31, 1978.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CAA), plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONSUELO GUARIN, DIONISIO BRIGOLA and GREGORIO BRIGOLA, defendants. DIONISIO BRIGOLA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The Republic, through the Civil Aeronautics Administration, filed a forcible entry case in the Pasay City Court against defendants, including appellant Dionisio Brigola, concerning a lot within the Manila International Airport. The City Court ruled for the plaintiff, ordering defendants to vacate. All defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. After the appeal was docketed, defendants Guarin and Gregorio Brigola filed their answer. Appellant Brigola, however, filed a motion to dismiss challenging venue, which the CFI deferred resolving until trial. He subsequently filed his answer with counterclaim.
Over eight months after the issues were joined, the plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 40, Section 9, and Rule 17, Section 3, for the defendants’ failure to prosecute. The CFI granted the motion, dismissing the appeal and ordering remand for execution of the City Court’s judgment. Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance gravely abused its discretion in dismissing appellant’s appeal for failure to prosecute.

RULING

No, the CFI did not gravely abuse its discretion. The dismissal was proper under Rule 17, Section 3, which allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails to prosecute an action for an unreasonable length of time. While a perfected appeal to the CFI results in a trial de novo, the appellant is not relieved of the duty to diligently prosecute the case. The burden of moving the case forward rests upon the appealing party, not the court or the appellee.
Appellant argued that only eight months had elapsed since the issues were joined, which was not an unreasonable delay. The Court found this unpersuasive. The appellant took no affirmative steps to advance the case after filing his answer. His prior motion to dismiss did not constitute active prosecution, and he exhibited indifference by his inaction. The determination of what constitutes an “unreasonable length of time” is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse, which appellant failed to demonstrate, the appellate court will not interfere. The presumption favors the correctness of the lower court’s action. The duty of the clerk of court to calendar a case does not excuse an appellant from his own obligation to prosecute his appeal with reasonable promptness. The orders of dismissal are affirmed.