GR 263061; (January, 2023) (Digest)
G.R. No. 263061 . January 10, 2023
Glenda Buray Ecleo, Petitioner, vs. Commission on Elections, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Glenda Buray Ecleo, a member of Lakas-Kampi and a candidate for Governor of Dinagat Islands, won the 2010 elections and was re-elected in 2013. On June 8, 2010, she filed her Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) as required by law. On December 13, 2014, the COMELEC, represented by its Campaign Finance Unit (CFU), filed a complaint motu proprio against Ecleo with the COMELEC Law Department for alleged violation of Section 100, in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, for exceeding the campaign expenditure limit. The complaint alleged that for the 2010 elections, with 70,353 registered voters, Ecleo’s allowable expenditure limit was P211,059.00 (P3.00 per voter under R.A. 7166), but her SOCE reflected spending of P230,000.00, an excess of P18,941.00. In her Counter-Affidavit, Ecleo denied the allegations, claiming she did not need to campaign heavily due to her popularity, and asserted her SOCE contained unsubstantiated amounts as her secretary prepared it without receipts. On June 23, 2021, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 21-0424-29, adopting the recommendation to file an Information against Ecleo. Ecleo received a copy on July 20, 2022, and filed this Petition for Certiorari on August 12, 2022, alleging grave abuse of discretion due to inordinate delay, that the complaint was moot as she had completed her terms, and that the SOCE was inherently defective.
ISSUE
1. Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution seven years from the time of the filing of the complaint amounting to inordinate delay?
2. Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it refused to consider the complaint as moot and academic?
3. Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it considered the inherently defective SOCE, which formed the basis for the complaint?
RULING
The Court GRANTED the Petition for Certiorari. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it directed its Law Department to file an Information against Ecleo seven years after the filing of the complaint, guilty of inordinate delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation, violating Ecleo’s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases under Article III, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution . Applying the four-factor test from Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, the Court found the delay unreasonable. The COMELEC violated its own Rule 34, Section 8 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which mandates termination of preliminary investigation within 20 days after receipt of counter-affidavits and resolution within 5 days thereafter. The delay of seven years was inordinate, especially given the simplicity of the issue—determining overspending involved a basic mathematical calculation, as held in the analogous case of Peñas v. COMELEC. The COMELEC offered no explanation for the delay. This inordinate delay caused prejudice to Ecleo, violating her right to speedy disposition. Consequently, the Court nullified the assailed Resolution and dismissed E.O. Case No. 14-598 against Ecleo. The Court deemed it superfluous to discuss the other issues raised.
