G.R. No. L-26054 July 21, 1978
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS PANAGUITON, ET AL., defendants, CUSTODIA J. VDA. DE VELASCO, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of ANGELES VELASCO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Luzon Surety Co., Inc., as surety, executed a bond for defendant Jesus Panaguiton in favor of International Tobacco Co., Inc. In consideration, several parties, including the deceased Angeles Velasco, executed an indemnity agreement and a mortgage in favor of Luzon Surety. Upon Panaguiton’s default, International Tobacco sued and obtained a judgment against both Panaguiton and Luzon Surety. Luzon Surety satisfied the judgment and then sued the indemnitors, including the estate of Angeles Velasco represented by appellant Custodia J. Vda. de Velasco, for reimbursement. The trial court rendered a joint and several judgment against all defendants.
The appellant, as administratrix, filed a petition for relief from judgment. She alleged she was never notified of the case hearings, rendering the judgment a nullity against her, and that she had a meritorious defense—the indemnity agreement was not signed by the deceased. She also claimed excusable negligence, believing she had sixty days to appeal. The trial court denied the petition, ruling her failure to appeal within thirty days from notice of the decision was fatal, making the judgment final.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

Yes, the trial court committed reversible error. The Supreme Court nullified the judgment against the appellant and remanded the case. The legal logic is twofold. First, the records confirmed appellant was not notified of the hearings. This deprivation of the opportunity to be heard constitutes a denial of procedural due process, a fundamental right. A judgment rendered without such notice is considered void or a nullity as to the affected party. The trial court’s focus on the lapse of the appeal period was misplaced because the core defect was the lack of jurisdiction over the appellant due to the failure of notice, not merely a procedural misstep.
Second, even on procedural grounds, the petition for relief was properly filed under Rule 38. Appellant received the decision on August 26, 1960, and filed her verified petition with an affidavit of merit on October 7, 1960. This was within the sixty-day period prescribed by Section 3, Rule 38 for filing such a petition based on mistake or excusable negligence. Her allegation of being a layperson without counsel, mistakenly believing she had sixty days to appeal, constituted excusable negligence warranting relief. The trial court therefore gravely erred in denying the petition, which was her proper remedy after the appeal period had lapsed. The case was remanded to allow the appellant her day in court to present evidence.