GR 25984; (October, 1970) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25984 October 30, 1970
ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (FTUP), respondents.
FACTS
The Alhambra Employees Association (FTUP), the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative for all employees of Alhambra Industries, Inc., filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the company. The union alleged that fifteen union-member drivers and helpers were being discriminated against by being denied the benefits and privileges of the subsisting collective bargaining agreement, due to their union membership, and that the company refused to negotiate regarding their inclusion. Alhambra Industries denied the charge, asserting that the fifteen drivers and helpers were not its employees but were separate and independent employees of its salesmen and propagandists, who controlled their selection, employment, compensation, suspension, and dismissal. The parties exhausted the grievance machinery steps in their collective bargaining agreement but failed to resolve the dispute over the true status of these drivers and helpers, leading the union to elevate the issue to the Court of Industrial Relations through the unfair labor practice complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations acted in excess of jurisdiction by rendering a judgment against Alhambra Industries, Inc., ordering it to extend all privileges, rights, and benefits under the collective bargaining agreement to the fifteen drivers and helpers, despite its finding that the company had not committed any act of unfair labor practice.
RULING
No, the Court of Industrial Relations did not act in excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The respondent court had categorically found that, in truth and in fact, the fifteen drivers and helpers were employees of Alhambra Industries, Inc., and not of its salesmen or propagandists. This finding was based on evidence that the company, through a “memorandum of instructions,” authorized the salesmen to engage the drivers and helpers; their salary came from the company in the form of a “driver allowance” given to the salesmen for payment; and their duties were dictated by the company, including driving company trucks and assisting in deliveries and inventories. The company’s failure to extend the collective bargaining agreement benefits to these actual employees through an elaborate artifice constituted a violation of its duty to bargain collectively and amounted to unfair labor practice. Consequently, the respondent court properly ordered the company to cease this practice and take affirmative action by granting the drivers and helpers all retroactive benefits from the effectivity of the first collective bargaining agreement, thereby effectuating the policies of the Industrial Peace Act. The writ of preliminary injunction was lifted and costs were imposed on the petitioner.
