G.R. No. 25726 , November 22, 1926
PANTALEON E. DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RESTITUTO VILLEGAS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

This case involves the execution of a final judgment in Civil Case No. 432, where Broadwell Hagans, as administrator of the estates of Juan Melgar and Vicenta Escio, was the judgment creditor, and Restituto Villegas was the judgment debtor. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering Villegas to return possession of two parcels of land to the estate and to deliver or pay the value of their fruits (corn and coconuts) from 1915 until execution.

To execute this judgment, the provincial sheriff, without prior court order and relying on a letter from the judgment creditor’s attorneys, unilaterally estimated the quantity and value of the fruits due. He demanded payment from Villegas based on these estimates, which exceeded the amounts specified in the judgment. When Villegas refused to pay this unauthorized amount, the sheriff levied upon and sold the two parcels of land at public auction without prior notice of seizure or annotation in the Registry of Property. The properties, with an assessed value of about P27,000, were awarded to the judgment creditor, Broadwell Hagans, for the amount of the judgment. Hagans did not deposit or pay the purchase price or execution expenses.

After the redemption period, Hagans petitioned the court to compel the sheriff to execute the final deed of sale. The court granted this motion without notifying Villegas. The sheriff then executed the deed in favor of Hagans. Subsequently, Hagans conveyed the properties to Pantaleon E. del Rosario, who was an heir and interested party in the estates of Melgar and Escio. Del Rosario registered the deed.

Villegas then filed a cross-complaint in a separate action initiated by Del Rosario, seeking to annul the sheriff’s sale and all subsequent acts. The trial court declared the sheriff’s proceedings null and void, absolved Villegas from Del Rosario’s complaint, and ordered Del Rosario to recognize Villegas’s rights over the land. Del Rosario appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the sheriff’s execution sale of the properties was valid.
2. Whether Pantaleon E. del Rosario is a purchaser in good faith and for value whose registered title is indefeasible.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the trial court’s judgment.

1. The Sheriff’s Execution Sale Was Null and Void. The sheriff committed grave irregularities that rendered the sale void:
* He arrogated judicial functions by unilaterally determining the quantity and value of the fruits due, which was a matter for the court to decide. The judgment itself did not fix the prices for corn for 1921-1923 or the value of coconuts on the date of return.
* He levied upon and sold properties valued at approximately P27,000 to satisfy a monetary judgment for the value of fruits, without first attempting to satisfy the judgment from the debtor’s personal property, as required by the Rules of Court.
* He conducted the sale without giving the required notice of seizure to the judgment debtor.
* The purchaser at the auction, Broadwell Hagans, never paid the purchase price or the execution expenses. A sale where the price is not paid is void and transfers no title.

2. Del Rosario is NOT a Purchaser in Good Faith and for Value. His registered title does not confer indefeasibility under the circumstances:
* Del Rosario was not a third party. He was an heir and interested party in the estates of Melgar and Escio. The conveyance from Hagans (the administrator) to Del Rosario was essentially a transfer to a co-owner of property acquired for the estate’s benefit. A person represented cannot be a third party with respect to their representative.
* He could not have been ignorant of the execution proceedings. As an attorney and heir interested in the estate, he was aware of the judgment and even intervened by instructing the sheriff via telegram on how to conduct the execution.
* Since the sheriff’s sale was null and void *ab initio*, it conveyed no title to Hagans. Consequently, Hagans had no title to transfer to Del Rosario. Registration under Act No. 2837 (the Land Registration Act) only renders a title indefeasible if the deed or transaction registered is itself valid and effective. Registration cannot cure the fundamental nullity of the source transaction.

The Court reserved Del Rosario’s right to petition the trial court for a proper determination of the value of the fruits due from Villegas and for the issuance of a correct writ of execution for that amount.