G.R. No. 25726 , November 22, 1926
PANTALEON E. DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RESTITUTO VILLEGAS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

This case involves the execution of a final judgment in Civil Case No. 432, where Broadwell Hagans, as administrator of the estates of Juan Melgar and Vicenta Escio, was the prevailing party against Restituto Villegas. The judgment ordered Villegas to return two parcels of land and deliver their fruits (corn and coconuts) from 1915 until execution. When the case was remanded for execution, the provincial sheriff, without a court order and based solely on a letter from the judgment creditor’s lawyers, unilaterally estimated the quantity and value of the fruits for years not specified in the judgment, demanding a sum from Villegas. Upon Villegas’s refusal to pay this inflated amount, the sheriff levied upon and sold the two parcels of land at public auction to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff adjudicated the properties to the judgment creditor, Broadwell Hagans, without requiring him to pay the bid price or execution expenses. Later, Hagans conveyed the properties to Pantaleon E. del Rosario, an heir and interested party in the estates. Del Rosario then registered the deed and sought to eject Villegas. Villegas resisted, arguing the execution sale was void.

ISSUE

1. Was the execution sale of the properties conducted by the sheriff valid?
2. Is Pantaleon E. del Rosario a purchaser in good faith and for value whose registered title should be protected?

RULING

1. NO, the execution sale was NULL AND VOID. The Supreme Court held that the sheriff’s acts constituted a gross abuse of authority and a violation of the judgment. The judgment fixed the annual products only for certain years. For subsequent years, it required the court to determine the prices at the time of execution. The sheriff arrogated judicial functions by unilaterally estimating the products and their value for years not covered by the judgment, without any court order. This rendered the entire execution proceeding, including the levy and sale, null and void. A void execution sale confers no title.

2. NO, Pantaleon E. del Rosario is NOT a purchaser in good faith and for value entitled to protection under the land registration law. The Court ruled that:
* Del Rosario was not a third party but an heir and interested party in the very estates (Melgar and Escio) for which the judgment was rendered. He was, in effect, the principal represented by the administrator, Broadwell Hagans. A principal cannot be a third party with respect to his agent’s acts.
* As an attorney and heir, he could not have been ignorant of the judgment and the execution proceedings. In fact, evidence showed he intervened by instructing the sheriff on how to conduct the sale.
* Since the execution sale was void *ab initio*, it transferred no title to Hagans. Consequently, Hagans had nothing valid to convey to Del Rosario. Registration of a void deed does not cure its invalidity or confer a better right against the original owner (Villegas) who was deprived of his property through an illegal process.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance was AFFIRMED. The proceedings and sale by the sheriff were declared null and void. Plaintiff-appellant Del Rosario was ordered to recognize defendant-appellee Villegas’s rights in the land. The Court reserved Del Rosario’s right to petition the lower court for a proper determination of the value of the fruits and for a new, valid writ of execution to satisfy the original judgment.