G.R. No. 25706 , November 2, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANUNCIACION ROSAL (alias MARIA A. ROSAL), defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Anunciacion Rosal, having become a widow on June 29, 1925, contracted a second marriage with Justino Velasco on August 19, 1925, before the lapse of 301 days from the death of her first husband. She was charged with violating Article 476 of the Penal Code. The defense filed a demurrer, arguing that the charge did not constitute a crime because Article 476 was the penal sanction for Article 45 of the Civil Code, and since Title 4 of the Civil Code (which included Article 45) had been suspended by order of Governor-General Weyler, Article 476 of the Penal Code was no longer applicable. The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed.

ISSUE

Whether Article 476 of the Penal Code, which penalizes a widow who contracts a second marriage within 301 days after the death of her husband, is still in force despite the suspension of the related civil provision (Article 45 of the Civil Code).

RULING

YES, Article 476 of the Penal Code is still in force. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court reasoned that:
1. The Penal Code existed independently of the Civil Code. Article 476 of the Penal Code was published and took effect in 1887, while the Civil Code (including Article 45) was promulgated in 1889. The penal provision was already a law before the civil provision it was meant to sanction came into existence. Therefore, the subsequent suspension of a part of the Civil Code (Title 4) could not affect the existence of the pre-existing penal law.
2. The purpose of Article 476 remains valid and necessary. The prohibition aims to prevent doubtful paternity and confusion regarding filiation, as a widow might have conceived by her late husband. This sound principle of public policy is not dependent on the civil code’s provisions on marriage.
3. Other laws presuppose its existence. Section 333(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born within 300 days after the dissolution of a marriage. Without Article 476’s prohibition, absurd situations could arise where a child could be conclusively presumed legitimate to two different husbands. Article 476 is necessary to avoid such inconsistencies.
4. The Court had previously recognized its force. In *United States v. Dulay*, the Court implicitly affirmed that Article 476 imposed a punishment for its violation.

Thus, the act of contracting a marriage within the prohibited period remains a criminal offense under Article 476 of the Penal Code, regardless of the suspension of the related civil code provisions. The demurrer should not have been sustained.