G.R. No. 25706 , November 2, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANUNCIACION ROSAL (alias MARIA A. ROSAL), defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Anunciacion Rosal, having become a widow on June 29, 1925, contracted a second marriage with Justino Velasco on August 19, 1925, before the lapse of 301 days from the death of her first husband. She was charged with violating Article 476 of the Penal Code. The defense filed a demurrer, arguing that the charge did not constitute a crime because Article 476 was the penal sanction for Article 45 of the Civil Code, and since Title 4 of the Civil Code (which included Article 45) had been suspended by a Governor-General’s order, Article 476 of the Penal Code was no longer applicable. The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed.

ISSUE

Whether Article 476 of the Penal Code, which penalizes a widow who contracts a second marriage within 301 days after the death of her husband, is still in force despite the suspension of the related civil provision (Article 45 of the Civil Code).

RULING

YES, Article 476 of the Penal Code is still in force. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Court reasoned that:
1. The Penal Code existed independently of the Civil Code. Article 476 of the Penal Code was published and took effect in 1887, while the Civil Code (containing Article 45) was promulgated in 1889. Therefore, the penal provision was not dependent on the later civil provision for its existence. The suspension of a part of the Civil Code could not affect the independent penal law.
2. The purpose of Article 476 is sound public policy. The prohibition aims to prevent doubtful paternity and confusion regarding filiation, as a widow might have conceived by her late husband. This objective remains valid regardless of the civil code’s status.
3. Other laws support its continued operation. Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes conclusive presumptions of legitimacy based on specific time periods (180 days after marriage and 300 days after dissolution). Without Article 476’s prohibition, contradictory presumptions of paternity could arise if a widow remarried too soon and gave birth within the overlapping periods.
4. The crime is distinct from civil validity. The fact that General Orders No. 68 (the Marriage Law) did not declare a marriage within the prohibited period void or voidable does not repeal Article 476. The penal article punishes the act of contracting the marriage, regardless of the marriage’s civil validity.

Consequently, the demurrer should not have been sustained, and the criminal case against Anunciacion Rosal must proceed.