G.R. No. 256452 , February 25, 2025
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. WILLEM JOHANNES PEEK, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS

This is a Concurring Opinion by Justice Dimaampao in the case against accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek. Peek was convicted for the crimes of rape and qualified trafficking in persons under Republic Act No. 9208 (the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003), as amended by Republic Act No. 10364 (the Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012). The ponencia (main decision by Justice Kho, Jr.) found Peek guilty. While Justice Dimaampao fully concurs with this finding, he writes separately to elaborate on the essence of the crime of trafficking in persons, particularly in response to the dissenting opinion of Justice Lazaro-Javier. The opinion references the case of People v. Arraz to outline the elements of qualified trafficking, noting that when the victim is a child, the prosecution does not need to prove the means (such as force or coercion) enumerated in the law, as a minor’s consent is legally immaterial. The ponencia determined that although Peek was charged under Section 4(e) of RA 9208 (maintaining or hiring a person for prostitution or pornography), his actual criminal liability falls under Section 4(a) for harboring and receiving a minor victim for sexual exploitation.

ISSUE

The central issue addressed in this concurring opinion is the proper understanding and application of the elements of qualified trafficking in persons, particularly when the victim is a child, and the correct characterization of the accused’s acts under the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, as amended.

RULING

Justice Dimaampao concurs with the ponencia that accused-appellant Willem Johannes Peek is guilty of both rape and qualified trafficking in persons. The opinion affirms that the essence of trafficking is exploitation and the commodification of human life. It clarifies that trafficking encompasses not just the initial recruitment or movement of a person but the entire process of exploitation, including acts done after the victim is in the trafficker’s custody, such as harboring and receiving. Citing People v. Arraz, the opinion reiterates the elements of qualified trafficking, emphasizing that for child victims, proof of the means used (force, coercion, etc.) is not required; it is sufficient to prove that the child was recruited, transported, harbored, or received for the purpose of exploitation. The opinion agrees with the ponencia‘s nuanced finding that Peek’s acts constitute harboring and receiving a minor for sexual exploitation under Section 4(a) of RA 9208, as amended, rather than the specific charge under Section 4(e). Finally, the opinion concludes by voting to DENY the appeal.