GR 25519; (January, 1970) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-25519 January 30, 1970
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Igmedio Yap and Hon. Judge Carlos Abiera of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, respondents.
FACTS
On March 19, 1965, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental granted the petition of respondent Igmedio Yap for naturalization. The Provincial Fiscal of Negros Occidental received a copy of the decision on March 31, 1965, while the Solicitor General received a copy on April 7, 1965. Upon the Solicitor General’s instruction, the Provincial Fiscal, through an assistant, filed a notice of appeal and the corresponding record on appeal on May 5, 1965. The trial judge disapproved the appeal in an order dated September 1, 1965, on the ground that the decision had become final, as the Provincial Fiscal received a copy on March 31, 1965. The Provincial Fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October 27, 1965. The Republic then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to declare the said orders null and void and to compel the approval of the record on appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the notice of the decision to the Provincial Fiscal or to the Solicitor General.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The thirty-day period to appeal should be counted from the notice to the Solicitor General. Citing the case of Republic vs. Chiu, the Court held that under Section 10 of the Revised Naturalization Law, the Solicitor General appears on behalf of the Republic, either personally or through a delegate like the provincial fiscal. The provincial fiscal’s appearance does not make him the counsel of record for the Republic; he acts merely as the representative of the Solicitor General, who remains the counsel of record. Therefore, notice to the Solicitor General, not the Provincial Fiscal, governs the computation of the appeal period. Since the Solicitor General received the decision on April 7, 1965, the appeal filed on May 5, 1965, was timely. The writ of mandamus is proper to compel the approval of the record on appeal. The orders dated September 1 and October 27, 1965, were set aside, and the respondent judge was directed to approve the record on appeal.