GR 252124; (July, 2024) (Digest)
G.R. No. 252124 . July 23, 2024.
BOHOL WISDOM SCHOOL, DR. SIMPLICIO YAP, JR., AND RAUL H. DELOSO, PETITIONERS, VS. MIRAFLOR MABAO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
Respondent Miraflor Mabao was a regular grade school teacher at petitioner Bohol Wisdom School (BWS). On September 21, 2016, she informed the school principal and the Head of the Administrative Team, petitioner Raul H. Deloso, that she was two months pregnant out of wedlock. The following day, September 22, 2016, she was summoned and verbally suspended by Deloso, who told her not to report for work until she could present documents showing she was married to her boyfriend. On September 27, 2016, she was formally served a Disciplinary Form and a Letter stating she was placed under indefinite suspension without pay until she was “duly married” to her boyfriend, citing that pre-marital sex leading to pregnancy was an “immoral act” and a ground for disciplinary action. Mabao filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal before the NLRC on October 5, 2016. She married her boyfriend on the same date, October 5, 2016. BWS sent her three return-to-work notices (dated October 7, November 3, and November 22, 2016), which she refused to receive. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Mabao, finding constructive dismissal. The NLRC reversed, finding the suspension was not tantamount to dismissal. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s decision, holding the suspension was illegal. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s finding that petitioners are liable for the illegal suspension of respondent Mabao.
RULING
The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The suspension of Mabao was illegal.
The Court held that an employer may validly suspend an employee as a disciplinary measure if the act or omission complained of constitutes a just or authorized cause for suspension under the Labor Code and if due process is observed. Here, both substantive and procedural due process were violated.
1. Substantive Due Process Violation: The ground for suspension—pregnancy out of wedlock—was not a valid cause. The Court cited the Magna Carta of Women ( Republic Act No. 9710 ), which explicitly outlaws the expulsion or non-readmission of women faculty due to pregnancy outside of marriage. While the act of pre-marital sex may be considered immoral, pregnancy itself is not a sin nor immoral. The suspension letter improperly conflated the pregnancy with the act that caused it. The condition imposed—that she must marry to lift the suspension—was an unlawful imposition on her personal life and a violation of her constitutional right to privacy. The suspension was based on a discriminatory policy penalizing pregnancy outside marriage, which the law prohibits.
2. Procedural Due Process Violation: The twin-notice rule was not complied with. Mabao was not given a written notice stating the particular acts or omissions for which her suspension was sought. The September 27, 2016 Disciplinary Form and Letter were served after the suspension had already been imposed verbally on September 22, 2016. Furthermore, the requirement for a hearing or conference where the employee can respond was not properly observed. The meeting on September 21, 2016 was merely an informational disclosure by Mabao about her pregnancy, not a disciplinary hearing. The subsequent meeting on September 22, 2016 was where the suspension was announced, not where she was given an opportunity to defend herself.
Consequently, the indefinite suspension without pay was illegal. The subsequent return-to-work notices did not cure the illegality of the initial suspension. The Court found no merit in petitioners’ arguments and upheld the monetary awards granted by the Labor Arbiter, as modified by the Court of Appeals, for backwages and allowances during the period of illegal suspension.
