G.R. No. 251693 . September 28, 2020
Jody C. Salas, ex rel Person Deprived of Liberty (PDL) Rodolfo C. Salas, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Thelma Bunyi-Medina, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, Branch 32, JCInsp. Lloyd Gonzaga, Warden of the Manila City Jail Annex, and All Those Taking Orders, Instructions and Directions from Him, Respondents.

FACTS

This case involves a Petition for Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of Rodolfo C. Salas, a detained individual charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The petition challenged his detention as illegal. The main opinion, penned by Justice Gaerlan, dismissed the petition, holding that habeas corpus is generally not the proper remedy when a person is detained under a valid judicial process, such as a warrant of arrest issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioner’s recourse was to pursue regular judicial remedies within the criminal case.
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Leonen agreed with the dismissal but elaborated on two key legal principles. First, he acknowledged the general rule but clarified the extraordinary circumstances where habeas corpus may still be viable despite an existing judicial order. Second, he addressed the substantive legal doctrine applicable to the charges against Salas, which forms the core of his concurrence.

ISSUE

The primary issue in the concurrence is whether the doctrine from People v. Hernandez—which holds that common crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed by the crime of rebellion—remains an absolute bar to prosecuting such common crimes separately under subsequent specific laws.

RULING

Justice Leonen concurs in the result to dismiss the habeas corpus petition. He clarifies that while habeas corpus is generally unavailable when detention is under judicial process, exceptional cases like mistaken identity, as in In re: Salibo, may warrant its issuance. However, no such exception exists here.
On the substantive issue, Leonen explains that the Hernandez doctrine is not an immutable constitutional principle but a judicial construction based on the penal laws existing at that time. He emphasizes that the legislature retains the authority to enact new laws defining and punishing, as distinct offenses, acts such as murder or arson committed in the course of rebellion. Therefore, when a subsequent statute like Presidential Decree No. 1866 (which penalizes crimes committed with the use of unlicensed firearms) defines such acts as separate crimes, prosecution under that specific law is permissible and not barred by Hernandez. The doctrine does not provide a blanket immunity for atrocities committed under the guise of political objectives. This qualification ensures that crimes violating basic human dignity can be prosecuted independently, aligning with developments in national and international law.