GR 249238 Singh (Digest)
G.R. No. 249238 , February 27, 2024
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. RUBY CUEVAS NG A.K.A. RUBY NG SONO, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
The case involves the issue of whether a foreign divorce decree obtained by mutual agreement of the spouses can be recognized in the Philippines. The ponencia, referencing prior rulings in Racho v. Tanaka, Basa-Egami v. Bersales, and Republic v. Bayog-Saito, concludes that such a divorce can be recognized under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. This provision allows a Filipino spouse to remarry if a foreign spouse validly obtains a divorce abroad that capacitates the foreign spouse to remarry. The dissenting opinion of Justice Singh argues against this conclusion, contending that Article 26(2) should be interpreted to cover only foreign divorces obtained through a judicial proceeding, not by mutual consent.
ISSUE
Whether a foreign divorce decree obtained by mutual consent (a no-fault divorce) should be recognized in the Philippines under Article 26(2) of the Family Code.
RULING
The dissenting opinion argues that foreign divorces obtained by mutual consent should not be recognized. The reasoning is based on four main points:
1. Legislative Intent: The deliberations of the Joint Civil Code and Family Code Law Committee reveal that Article 26(2) was crafted as a narrow exception to the nationality principle (Article 15 of the Civil Code) to address the specific unfair situation where a foreign spouse obtains a judicial divorce decree abroad. The committee members initially voted to delete the provision, viewing it as an implicit recognition of divorce, and intended its application to be restrained.
2. Basis for Recognizing Foreign Judgments: The procedural rule for recognizing foreign judgments, Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, applies only to “judgments or final orders” from foreign judicial tribunals. Its grounds for repelling a judgmentβwant of jurisdiction, notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of law/factβare elements of a judicial proceeding. Therefore, the legal framework for recognition presupposes a judicial divorce, not one by mutual consent.
3. The Nationality Principle: Article 15 of the Civil Code states that laws relating to family rights and duties, and the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon Filipinos, even when living abroad. Recognizing a divorce by mutual consent, which is essentially a contractual repudiation of marriage, would violate this principle by allowing foreign law (permitting such divorce) to supersede Philippine law (which does not allow divorce) for a Filipino citizen.
4. Public Policy: The 1987 Constitution explicitly protects marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family. Philippine law reflects a strong public policy against divorce. Extending Article 26(2) to divorces by mutual consent, which lack judicial scrutiny, would contravene this fundamental policy. There is a substantial distinction between judicially decreed divorces (recognized based on comity and judicial authority) and divorces by mutual consent.
The dissent concludes that the Court’s role is to uphold law and public policy, not to override it, and that spouses in such situations have other remedies, such as seeking annulment or a judicial divorce abroad.
