G.R. No. 248569 , January 15, 2025
Ericson C. Cabutaje, Petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines and Romelia A. Cabutaje, Respondents.

FACTS

The case involves a petition to declare the marriage between petitioner Ericson C. Cabutaje and private respondent Romelia A. Cabutaje null and void based on the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The ponencia (majority decision) granted the petition, finding that the requisites of gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence for psychological incapacity, as clarified in Tan-Andal v. Andal, were sufficiently shown. The psychological evaluation was conducted by Dr. Nedy Tayag, based on interviews with the petitioner, his sister, and a common friend of the spouses, Cherry Christine Zunega, who knew the private respondent from before the marriage.

ISSUE

Whether the totality of evidence presented, particularly regarding the requisite of “juridical antecedence,” sufficiently proves that the private respondent’s psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

RULING

The dissenting opinion disagrees with the ponencia’s finding of juridical antecedence. While acknowledging that juridical antecedence can be determined by examining the “lived conjugal life,” the dissent finds the evidence insufficient. Specifically, it points out that the ponencia does not identify the evidence upon which psychologist Dr. Nedy Tayag based his assessment of antecedence. The facts attested to by the common friend, Cherry Christine Zunega—that the couple had a “whirlwind romance” and were forced to marry due to an unplanned pregnancy—are deemed insufficient. These facts, while depicting a less-than-ideal situation, are not reasonably traceable to the existence or origin of a personality disorder constituting psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage. The dissent emphasizes that facts causally linking the spouse’s behavior during the marriage to pre-marital indicators are crucial for establishing juridical antecedence. Without such a causal link, the requirement under Article 36 that the incapacity exists “at the time of the celebration of the marriage” is not met. Consequently, the dissenting opinion submits that the marriage should not be nullified as it legally warrants preservation under prevailing law and jurisprudence.