GR 245862; (November, 2020) (Digest)
G.R. No. 245862 , November 03, 2020
HERMIS CARLOS PEREZ, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
Petitioner Hermis Carlos Perez, then Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The charge stemmed from a 2001 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) he executed with a private corporation, ECCE, for a solid waste management program without conducting a public bidding. The complaint was filed in April 2016, approximately 14 years after the execution of the MOA. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause and filed an Information against Perez in July 2018. Perez moved to quash the Information before the Sandiganbayan, arguing prescription of the offense and a violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases, citing the 14-year delay from the 2002 transaction to the 2016 complaint. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion.
ISSUE
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Perez’s Motion to Quash, specifically regarding the claims of prescription and violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On prescription, the Court ruled that the offense had not prescribed. For violations of R.A. No. 3019 , the prescriptive period is fifteen years. The period commenced not from the date of the MOA’s execution in 2001-2002, but from the date of its discovery by the offended party, which in this context refers to the State. The Court found that the prescriptive period began to run only from the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman in April 2016. Since the Information was filed in July 2018, well within the fifteen-year period from that point, the charge had not prescribed.
Regarding the right to speedy disposition of cases, the Court applied the balancing test from Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, weighing the length of delay, reasons for the delay, assertion or failure to assert the right, and prejudice to the accused. The Court found the 14-year period from the transaction to the filing of the complaint was not inordinate, as it constituted the State’s investigatory period to uncover the complex transaction. The subsequent proceedings before the Ombudsman (from complaint in 2016 to Information in 2018) were not unreasonably delayed. Crucially, Perez failed to timely assert his right during the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, he did not demonstrate that the delay was attended by vexatious, capricious, or oppressive circumstances, or that it impaired his defense. Thus, no violation of his constitutional right was established.